Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 28.10.2010 «Дело Рудаков (Rudakov) против России» [англ.]

tioned requirements. The sole purpose of those examinations was to respond to the applicant's health complaints. The medical specialists who had examined the applicant were not equipped to identify the nature and origin of his injuries or even to determine the period when they had occurred. In addition, the Court is not convinced that the prison medical personnel enjoyed the requisite level of independence from the authorities implicated in the ill-treatment of the applicant. In this respect, the Court notes with concern that a failure to request an expert opinion led, among other things, to the loss of opportunities to collect evidence of the ill-treatment.
64. The Court also considers it extraordinary that in delivering his decision of 30 October 2003 the deputy prosecutor did not make any reference to the records of the applicant's medical examinations and merely dismissed the applicant's complaints because there had been no criminal conduct in the officer's actions (see paragraph 17 above). It was not until 2 March 2004 that the deputy prosecutor included in his decision statements by medical assistant M., who had examined the applicant on 11 July 2003. The medical records drawn up on 11 and 14 July 2003 and statements by doctor B. appeared for the first time in the decision of 19 April 2004. However, the deputy prosecutor confined himself to mere reiteration of the records and medical specialists' statements (see paragraph 19 above) and did not attempt to examine the medical evidence before him or to draw conclusions on that basis. In this connection the Court is concerned that the lack of any "objective" evidence of criminal conduct - which could have been provided by medical or expert reports - was subsequently relied on by the deputy prosecutor as a ground for his decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the officer. Furthermore, the Court considers it peculiar that in the absence of any evidence, such as medical experts' findings to that effect, the deputy prosecutor was able to conclude that the applicant had received injuries prior or after the incident on 11 July 2003 (see paragraph 22 above).
65. Secondly, the Court observes a selective and somewhat inconsistent approach to the assessment of evidence by the investigating authorities. It is apparent from the decision submitted to the Court that the prosecution authorities based their conclusions mainly on the statements given by the warders involved in the incident. The applicant's right to participate effectively in the investigation was not secured. It transpires from the deputy prosecutors' decision that he only heard the applicant in person some time after 1 April 2004, when the Frunzenskiy District Court had quashed his decision of 2 March 2004. In any event, although excerpts from the applicant's complaints to the prosecution authorities were included in the first decisions not to institute criminal proceedings, the prosecution authorities did not consider the applicant's statements to be credible, apparently because they reflected a personal opinion and constituted an accusatory tactic by the applicant. However, the investigator did regard the warders' testimonies as credible, despite the fact that their statements could have constituted defence tactics, could have been called forth by corporate solidarity and have been aimed at damaging the applicant's credibility. In the Court's view, the prosecuting investigation applied different standards when assessing the statements, as those made by the applicant or, for that matter by his inmate Mr Li., were deemed to be subjective but not those given by the warders. The credibility of the latter statements should also have been questioned, as the prosecuting investigation was supposed to establish whether the warders were liable on the basis of disciplinary or criminal charges (see Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria, No

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