Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 23.09.2010 «Дело Искандаров (Iskandarov) против России» [англ.]

er conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."
137. The Government contested that argument. They claimed that between 9 December 2004 and 4 April 2005 the applicant had been lawfully detained with a view to his extradition and that he had not been detained by the Russian authorities after 4 April 2005. They reaffirmed that State agents had not been involved in the applicant's kidnapping and transfer from Russia to Tajikistan.
138. The applicant reiterated his complaint.

A. Admissibility

139. The Court reiterates that Article 5 - paragraph 1 of which proclaims the "right to liberty" - is concerned with a person's physical liberty. Its aim is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary fashion. In order to determine whether someone has been "deprived of his liberty" within the meaning of Article 5 the starting-point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 42, Reports 1996-III). The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance (see Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, Series A No. 39, and Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], No. 3394/03, § 73, ECHR 2010-...).
140. The Court points out at the outset that, in this particular case, owing to the extreme scarcity of information at its disposal and the lack of any official records concerning the applicant's removal from Russian territory, the Court is unable to establish in detail all the circumstances surrounding the applicant's transfer from Korolev to Dushanbe. In particular, it remains unknown whether at some point in time during that journey the applicant was confined to a cell or locked up in any premises. However, the Court has established that he was accompanied by Russian State agents and was brought to Tajikistan against his will (see paragraph 115 above). In the Court's view, this could not be considered to be a mere restriction of his freedom of movement as his journey was imposed on him by State agents (see, mutatis mutandis, Medvedyev and Others, cited above, § 79). The relatively short duration of the period during which the applicant was under the control of the Russian authorities is not decisive for determining whether there was a deprivation of liberty in the circumstances of the case (see X and Y v. Sweden, No. 7376/76, Commission decision of 7 October 1976, Decisions and Reports (DR) 7, p. 123, and X v. Austria, No. 8278/78, Commission decision of 13 December 1979, DR 18, p. 154).
141. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the applicant's situation while under the control of Russian State agents following his abduction on 1

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