Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 12.05.2010 «Дело Елдашев (Yeldashev) против России» [англ.]

not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
22. The Government argued that the judgment of 21 June 2002 had been enforced within a reasonable time.
23. The Court notes that the enforcement of the judgment lasted from 24 July 2002, when the judgment became binding, to 27 June 2003, when the applicant was discharged from service. Hence, the enforcement period amounts to eleven months.
24. The Court considers that the overall time taken by the authorities to enforce this judgment does not appear unreasonable in the light of the established case-law, especially bearing in mind that enforcement of a judgment included allocation of a flat, which may admittedly take a longer time than payment of a sum of money (see Zheleznyakovy v. Russia (dec.), No. 3180/03, 15 March 2007).
25. There has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

III. Alleged violation of Article 6
of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
in respect of enforcement of the judgment
of 3 September 2002

26. The applicant complained about non-enforcement of the judgment of 3 September 2002. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the relevant parts of which have been quoted above.
27. The Government argued that the delay in the enforcement was largely attributable to the applicant: between October 2002 and April 2004 he had not submitted the writ of execution to the competent body, and in December 2004 he had provided wrong bank account details.
28. The Court observes that the enforcement of the judgment in question lasted from October 2002 to February 2005, i.e. two years and four months.
29. In so far as the Government suggested that the period of enforcement should run from the moment when the applicant submitted enforcement papers to a competent authority, the Court reiterates that where a judgment is against the State, the State must take the initiative to enforce it (see the above cited Akashev, §§ 21 - 23).
30. The above period appears incompatible with the requirements of the Convention. The Government did not provide convincing evidence that appropriate action had been taken by the respondent authorities to comply with their obligations in this respect. The judgment was not difficult to enforce because it required only a bank transfer, and the applicant did not obstruct the enforcement.
31. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

IV. Application of Article 41 of the Convention

32. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
33. The Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court any claim for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, "failing which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part".
34. On 11 December 2008, after the present application had been declared admissible, the Court invited the applicant to submit his claims for just satisfaction by 4 February 2009. The applicant did not submit any such claims.
35. In these circumstances, the Court makes no award under Article 41 of the Convention.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMO

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