Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 08.04.2010 «Дело Сизинцева и другие (Sizintseva and others) против России» [англ.]

ecision of 31 August 1994) and dismisses the objection.
29. The Court further notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

(a) Article 6 of the Convention
i. Supervisory review procedure: legal certainty
30. The Court reiterates that the quashing by way of supervisory review of a judicial decision which has become final and binding may render the litigant's right to a court illusory and infringe the principle of legal certainty (see, among many other authorities, {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 56 - 58, 24 July 2003). Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 24, 18 January 2007, and Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, §§ 25 - 34, 31 July 2008).
31. At the outset the Court notes that in the Government's view the annulment of the judgments on supervisory review was required by the need to rectify a fundamental defect in the initial domestic proceedings. The Court reiterates its constant approach that a jurisdictional error, a serious breach of court procedure or abuses of power may, in principle, be regarded as a fundamental defect and therefore justify the quashing (see Luchkina v. Russia, No. 3548/04, § 21, 10 April 2008). However, nothing in the respective rulings of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic in the cases at hand enables the Court to conclude that the initial judgments were indeed quashed because these courts had ruled on the constitutionality of the federal law in excess of their jurisdiction. In none of the judgments was the alleged jurisdictional error or abuse of competence or any other procedural defect cited as a ground for the annulment of the lower courts' findings. On the contrary, it clearly follows from the wording of the supervisory-instance rulings that the sole ground for the quashing was the misinterpretation and incorrect application of the provisions of the said Federal Law by the courts. Furthermore, the respondent authority did not claim before the supervisory-review that the previous proceedings had been tarnished by a fundamental defect, such as, in particular, a jurisdictional error, serious breaches of court procedure or abuses of power (see Luchkina, cited above). Such argument was only advanced in the Government's observations. In the absence of any reference to the ground for quashing cited by the Government in the texts of the supervisory-instance rulings, the Court is unable to conclude that the quashing was caused, and even less justified by the substantive jurisdictional error by the lower courts referred to by the Government. It therefore rejects the Government's argument.
32. The Court further reiterates its constant approach that in the absence of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings a party's disagreement with the assessment made by the first-instance and appeal courts is not a circumstance of a substantial and compelling character warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see Dovguchits v. Russia, No. 2999/03, § 30, 7 June 2007; and Kot, cited above, § 29). The Government did not put forward any arguments which would enable the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present five cases. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
ii. Supervisory review procedure: procedural issues
33. With regard to the complaint about the procedural defects of the hearing before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha (

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