Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 08.04.2010 «Дело Лутохин (Lutokhin) против России» [англ.]

ted Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 162, Series A No. 25).
49. The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. Yet it cannot be said that detention on remand in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see {Kudla}, No. 30210/96, §§ 92 - 94, ECHR 2000-XI).
50. When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, No. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, No. 47095/99, § 102, ECHR 2002-VI, and Kehayov v. Bulgaria, No. 41035/98, § 64, 18 January 2005).
51. The extreme lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as an
aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the
impugned detention conditions were "degrading" from the point of view of
Article 3 (see {Karalevicius} v. Lithuania, No. 53254/99, § 36, 7 April
2005). In its previous cases where applicants had at their disposal less
2
than 3 m of personal space, the Court found that the overcrowding was so
severe as to justify of itself a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention (see, among many others, Lind v. Russia, No. 25664/05, §§ 59 -
60, 6 December 2007; Kantyrev v. Russia, No. 37213/02, § 50 - 51, 21 June
2007; Andrey Frolov v. Russia, No. 205/02, § 47 - 49, 29 March 2007; Labzov
v. Russia, No. 62208/00, §§ 44 - 46, 16 June 2005).
52. Lastly, the Court reiterates that it must be satisfied that the conditions of the applicant's detention constituted treatment which exceeded the minimum threshold for Article 3 of the Convention (see Maltabar and Maltabar v. Russia, No. 6954/02, § 96, 29 January 2009) and in assessing the circumstances of the case and the evidence presented, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" (see Ireland, 18 January 1978, § 161, Series A No. 25).
(b) Application of these principles to the present case
53. The Court observes that the applicant did not support his allegations as to the appalling detention conditions with sufficient evidence. The Government, in turn, submitted no information regarding the applicant's four-day detention in the temporary confinement ward, as had the exact number of detainees per cell held together with the applicant in the remand centre.
54. In this connection, it should be noted that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation), because in certain instances the respondent Government alone have access to the information capable of corroborating or refuting the applicant's allegations. A failure on the Government's part to submit such information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of these allegations (see {Timurtas} v. Turkey, No. 23531/94, §§ 66 and 70, ECHR 2000-

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