Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 17.12.2009 «Дело Колчинаев (Kolchinayev) против России» [англ.]

ed by the Supreme Court of Russia on 11 October 1995 which is prior to 5 May 1998, the date on which the Convention was ratified by Russia. This period cannot therefore be taken into consideration. As regards the new trial which ended with the final judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 February 2003, the Court considers in this connection that the applicant was "notified" of the charge against him on the day when the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia quashed his conviction, that is on 4 September 1996. However, the period to be taken into account began only on 5 May 1998, the date when the Convention was ratified by Russia. It ended, as indicated, on 12 February 2003 with the final judgment of the appeal court. Yet, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after the ratification date, due regard must be had to the state of proceedings at the material time. At the ratification date the criminal proceedings had been pending for approximately one year and eight months.
17. Thus, the period to be assessed in the present case lasted for six years, five months and ten days altogether for two levels of jurisdiction, of which four years, ten months and eight days fall within the Court's competence.
(b) Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
18. The Court reiterates that an accused in criminal proceedings should be entitled to have his case conducted with special diligence. The Convention institutions have consistently taken the approach that Article 6, in respect of criminal matters, was designed to avoid that a person charged should remain too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate (see Nakhmanovich v. Russia, No. 55669/00, § 89, 2 March 2006).
19. The Court further reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, {Pelissier} and Sassi v. France [GC], No. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
20. As to the complexity of the present case, the Court accepts that, in principle, the remoteness of the events may cause certain difficulties in establishing and assessing facts related to the criminal offence. It should be noted, however, that the events in question had already been subject to judicial examination in 1992 - 1995, and were thus not completely unknown to the investigative and judicial authorities. Moreover, in the Court's view, the complexity of the case does not suffice, in itself, to account for the length of the proceedings and regard should be had to the other factors (see Golovkin v. Russia, No. 16595/02, § 39, 3 April 2008).
21. As to the conduct of the applicant, the Court is not convinced by the Government's argument that there were any delays which could be attributed to him and his counsel. Nothing in the submitted materials shows that their conduct at the hearings had been obstructive. The Court reiterates that at all events applicants cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in their defence (see {Yagci} and {Sargin} v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A No. 319-A). It should thus be concluded, that studying the case documents and lodging applications, even in large numbers, during the course of the trial cannot be viewed as factors justifying the length of the proceedings at issue.
22. As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that there were substantial periods of inactivity for which the Government have not submitted any satisfactory explanation and which are attributable to the domestic authorities. In particular, the Government failed to explain why it had taken more than three years and nine months, of which two years, nine months and twenty-seven days fall within the Court's competence

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