Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 08.10.2009 «Дело Финков (Finkov) против России» [англ.]

ng should not be taken into account.
94. Secondly, the periods of pure non-enforcement should not be taken into account in respect of the complaint concerning the length if the Court has already considered these periods when assessing the complaint about the non-enforcement (see Malama v. Greece, No. 43622/98, § 34, ECHR 2001-II; Androsov v. Russia, No. 63973/00, § 76, 6 October 2005; Alekseyev v. Russia (dec.), No. 5836/05, 13 November 2008; Lukyanchenko v. Ukraine, No. 17327/02, § 33, 15 May 2008; Kabkov v. Russia, No. 12377/03, § 49, 17 July 2008; and Veretennikov v. Russia, No. 8363/03, § 31, 12 March 2009).
95. The Court finally reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

2. Application of the above principles in the present case

(a) Proceedings for compensation for health damage and food allowance
i. Periods to be taken into account
96. The Court firstly notes that the period before the final judgment of 18 November 1997 cannot be included into the period of length ratione temporis, as the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia only on 5 May 1998.
97. The Court further notes that as the period of non-enforcement was already assessed above and should not be included in the length of proceedings (see paras. 74 and 94), the first period to be taken into consideration lasted from 15 March 2001, when the proceedings were reopened by way of supervisory review, until 7 May 2003, when the judgment of 10 December 2002 became final (see paras. 8 - 15 above).
98. The second period started on 13 November 2003 with the quashing of the final judgment, and lasted until 7 July 2005, the date of another final judgment (see paras. 16 - 33 above).
99. The third period began on 15 February 2006, when the proceedings were reopened again, and ended on 17 April 2006 with their discontinuation (see paras. 34 - 36 above).
100. The total length to be assessed is thus three years, 11 months and 16 days. There were three levels of jurisdiction.
ii. Reasonableness of the length of proceedings
101. The Government submitted that the length of proceedings in the present case complied with the "reasonable time" requirement of Article 6. The proceedings had been factually complex. The applicant had contributed to the delay in the proceedings by submitting additional claims, a request before the Constitutional Court and by his occasional failure to appear for the hearings. The domestic authorities had not been responsible for any important delays in the examination of the case. The hearings had been scheduled regularly; the court had examined the case on the merits several times.
102. The applicant maintained his complaint.
103. The Court considers that the case was not particularly difficult to determine. There was no need to hear witnesses or to have expert opinions in the case. There is nothing to suggest that the volume of written evidence was excessive. There was no other reason for the hearings to be lengthy.
104. As concerns the applicant's conduct the Court notes that the applicant should not be held responsible for amending his claims and asking to adjourn hearings in order to obtain additional evidence. It has been the Court's constant approach that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in the defence of his interests (see Skorobogatova v. Russia, No. 33914/02, § 47, 1 December 2005). The Court further considers negligible the delays

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