ry and infringe the principle of legal certainty (see, among many other authorities, {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 56 - 58, 24 July 2003). Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 24, 18 January 2007, and Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, §§ 25 - 34, 31 July 2008).
20. The Court observes that in the cases at hand the judgments were set aside by way of a supervisory review solely on the ground that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the substantive law. The Court reiterates its constant approach that in the absence of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings a party's disagreement with the assessment made by the first-instance and appeal courts is not a circumstance of a substantial and compelling character warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see Dovguchits v. Russia, No. 2999/03, § 30, 7 June 2007; and Kot v. Russia, cited above, § 29). The Government did not put forward any arguments which would enable the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present two cases. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Supervisory review procedure: procedural issues
21. With regard to the complaint about the procedural defects of the hearing before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), the Court finds that, having concluded that there had been an infringement of the applicant's "right to a court" by the very use of the supervisory review procedure, it is not necessary to consider whether the procedural guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention were available in those proceedings (cf. Volkova v. Russia, No. 48758/99, § 39, 5 April 2005).
2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
22. The Court reiterates that the existence of a debt confirmed by a binding and enforceable judgment constitutes the beneficiary's "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (see, among other authorities, Androsov v. Russia, No. 63973/00, § 69, 6 October 2005).
23. The Court has found in many cases that the quashing of the enforceable judgments frustrated the applicants' reliance on the binding judicial decision and deprived them of an opportunity to receive the money they had legitimately expected to receive (see, among others, Ivanova v. Russia, No. 11697/05, § 23, 24 April 2008, Dmitriyeva v. Russia, No. 27101/04, § 32, 3 April 2008). In these circumstances, even assuming that the interference was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the Court considers that the quashing of the enforceable judgment in the applicants' favour by way of supervisory review placed an excessive burden on them and was incompatible with Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1. There has therefore been a violation of that Article in the present two cases.
III. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 On account
of non-enforcement
24. The applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments.
25. The Government argued that the first applicant's complaint was inadmissible. First, the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, such as a claim for damages, an adjustment for the cost of living, and a negligence action. Second, he had submitted enforcement papers to bailiffs instead of the Ministry of Finance, received the writ of execution from the first instance court with a three months' delay and recalled the writ from the Ministry one month before quashing. The Government did not make submissions on the
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