Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 09.07.2009 «Дело Кононович (Kononovich) против России» [англ.]

ing 3 November 2002, that is, the date of the introduction of the application. Therefore, the Government's objection that the complaint has been submitted too late must be dismissed.
51. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

52. Under the Court's case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention can be justified only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty. It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release (see Labita, cited above, § 152).
53. The Court accepts that the applicant's detention could have initially been warranted by a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the thefts.
54. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty (see Labita, cited above, § 153).
55. The Court observes that in the present case the domestic courts essentially referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant. On one occasion they also mentioned his previous conviction as a reason for refusal of his release. As for the applicant's detention pending trial, the court consistently ruled that the defendants' release "might impede a thorough, complete and objective examination of the case".
56. As regards the domestic authorities' reliance on the gravity of the charges as the decisive element justifying pre-trial detention, the Court reiterates that the need to continue a deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence (see Panchenko, cited above, § 102, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001). In the present case, however, it appears that the domestic courts assumed that the gravity of the charges carried such a preponderant weight that they did not even consider any other pertinent facts. There was no explanation provided as to how the fact that the applicant had an earlier conviction was relevant to the matter. Nor did the trial court elucidate in what way the applicant's release "might impede a thorough, complete and objective examination of the case".
57. The Court further notes that the trial court used the same summary formula to extend pre-trial detention of the three defendants. No regard had been had to the applicant's individual circumstances.
58. Lastly, the Court observes that at no point in the proceedings did the domestic courts explain in their decisions why alternatives to the deprivation of liberty would not have ensured that the trial would follow its proper course.
59. The Court has frequently found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the C

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