Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 29.01.2009 «Дело Левищев (Levishchev) против России» [англ.]

dled, and the applicant's litigation with the command had been justified.
21. With regard to the applicability of Article 6, the Court recalls that it has already dismissed the Government's similar arguments in another case (see Tetsen v. Russia, No. 11589/04, § 18, 3 April 2008). With regard to abuse of the right of petition, the Court does not discern on the applicant's part any intent to deceive.
22. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

23. The Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, No. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). To decide if the delay was reasonable, the Court will look at how complex the enforcement proceedings were, how the applicant and the authorities behaved, and what the nature of the award was (see Raylyan v. Russia, No. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
24. In the case at hand, the judgment awarded the applicant a flat at his place of duty. Even though the judgment did not name the applicant's place of duty, the parties agree that the flat had to be provided in Moscow.
25. This being so, the Court considers that the period of enforcement was four years and one month: from the date when the judgment became binding (16 March 2001) to the date when the city authorities invited the applicant to formalise his ownership of the flat in Moscow (5 May 2005). This period is incompatible with the requirements of the Convention, and in the circumstances of the present case the Court finds no justification for this delay.
26. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II. Alleged violation of Article 4 of the Convention

27. The applicant complained under Article 4 of the Convention that he had to continue to serve against his will awaiting the provision of the housing. Insofar as relevant, this Article reads as follows:
"2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
...
(b) any service of a military character...."
28. The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The applicant had himself chosen to continue to serve awaiting the provision of the housing.
29. The applicant maintained his complaint.
30. The Court considers that this complaint is inadmissible as follows.
31. Article 4 § 3 (b) expressly excludes military service from the otherwise prohibited "forced or compulsory labour". This rule covers also the obligation to continue a service entered into voluntarily (see W, X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, Nos 3435/67, 3436/67, 3437/67, and 3438/67, Commission decision of 19 July 1968, Collection 28, pp. 109 - 131). Hence this complaint would have had no merit, even if the applicant had been retained in the army against his will.
32. Be that as it may, the Court notes that the applicant enlisted voluntarily and had had a career in the army. Furthermore, he stayed in the service after term by his own choice. Indeed, section 23 § 1 of the Federal Law on the Status of Servicemen as cited above and interpreted by the Constitutional Court, may be considered as a social guarantee to servicemen: it protects them against homelessness by making discharge conditional on provision of housing. This law does not prevent a serviceman from leaving if he is prepared to leave without the housing. In the case at hand, the applicant refused to be retired "flatless", and it is not open to him to blame the authorities fo

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