s a fundamental element of family life and that furthermore the family relationship is not terminated by reason of the fact that the child has been taken into public care (see Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), 24 March 1988, § 59, Series A No. 130). The Court finds that the restrictions on the applicant's access to A. between 11 December 2003, which is the date on which A. was removed from her adoptive family for urgent medical treatment, and 2 November 2005, the date on which A. was returned to the applicant and his wife, amounted to an interference with his right to respect for family life.
2. Whether the interference
was "in accordance with the law"
92. For an interference to be justified according to the second paragraph of Article 8, it has to be shown to be "in accordance with the law", to have an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under this paragraph and to be "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim or aims.
93. As to whether the measure in question was "in accordance with the law", the Court would first point out that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply that law (see, for example, Eriksson v. Sweden, 22 June 1989, § 62, Series A No. 156). The Court observes that the restrictions on access to A. were examined by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 60 - 62 above) and that nothing in their judgments suggests that they were contrary to Russian law (see also Article 75 of the Family Code in the Relevant Domestic Law section above).
94. The interference at issue was thus "in accordance with the law".
3. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim
95. The Court does not doubt that the restrictions on the applicant's access to A. were imposed with the legitimate aim of protecting A.'s health and rights.
4. Whether the interference was
"necessary in a democratic society"
96. It has also to be considered whether the measures at issue could be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society". The notion of necessity implies that the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States. In this context, the Court also reiterates that a care order should in principle be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the parents and the child (see Olsson, cited above, § 81). Thus, severe and lasting restrictions on access which are of a long duration are particularly likely to be disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued (see Eriksson, cited above, §§ 71 and 72).
97. The Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant's complaints separately in relation to the following two periods: between 11 December 2003 and 25 January 2005; and from 25 January to 2 November 2005.
(a) 11 December 2003 - 25 January 2005
98. The Court notes that A. was removed from her family on 11 December 2003 and that despite the explicit and multiple requests of the applicant and his wife to see their daughter (see paragraph 42 above), the authorities denied them this opportunity for one year, one month and fifteen days until 25 January 2005, which is the date on which the domestic courts ordered the authorities not to interfere with the parents' right to communicate with A. and participate in her upbringing.
99. The Court would note that by removing A. from her adoptive family under Section 77 of the Family Code the domestic authorities restricted but did
> 1 2 3 ... 24 25 26 27
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
