e Chamber held that "there [had] been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in that the applicant [had] not receive[d] effective legal assistance during the appeal proceedings".
B. The parties' submissions
50. The parties observations submitted in writing and presented orally during the hearing of 20 January 2010 can be summarised as follows:
1. The Government
(a) Loss of victim status
51. The Government's central argument was that the quashing of the judgment and the very fact of the retrial were per se "sufficient redress" for the violation complained of in the original application. In support of this they referred to a number of Russian cases: Ponushkov v. Russia, No. 30209/04, 6 November 2008; Ryabov v. Russia, No. 3896/04, 31 January 2008; Davidchuk v. Russia (dec.), No. 37041/03, 1 April 2008; Mikhail Brinzevich v. Russia (dec.), No. 6822/04, 11 December 2007; Babunidze v. Russia (dec.), No. 3040/03, 15 May 2007; Fedosov v. Russia (dec.), No. 42237/02, 25 January 2007; Nikishina v. Russia (dec.), No. 45665/99, 12 September 2000; and Wong v. Luxemburg (dec.), No. 38871/02, 30 August 2005.
52. As to the second set of the proceedings (the hearing of 29 November 2007), the Government claimed that even if the circumstances complained of amounted to a violation of Article 6, these new events bore no relation to the present case and should have been presented by the applicant as a new application and communicated to the Government as a separate case. The Government claimed that they had not had the opportunity to comment on those new submissions.
(b) Waiver of legal assistance
53. The Government maintained that the applicant's rights under Article 6 § 3 (c) had not been breached in the appeal hearing of 29 November 2007. The State could not be held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of counsel appointed for legal-aid purposes. The Government suggested that the applicant should bear the consequences of the conduct of Ms A. (the court-appointed lawyer) in the proceedings, namely her failure to ask in writing for a replacement lawyer or for an adjournment. The Government further claimed that the applicant had not requested a personal meeting with his lawyer in his additional statement of appeal or the additional motions he lodged with the Supreme Court before the start of the hearing. He had not asked the Supreme Court to replace the counsel, neither had he expressed the wish to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. The Government appeared to claim that in order to have the benefit of the legal-aid scheme he should have asked for a replacement lawyer whom he trusted. By failing to do so the applicant had waived his right to legal assistance.
(c) Effective legal assistance
54. The Government claimed that Ms A. herself had not considered that a personal meeting between her and the applicant had been necessary. She had taken her appointment quite seriously: she had studied the case file in advance, and had consulted with the applicant in private before the start of the hearing. She had not asked for a face-to-face meeting with the applicant; however, the authorities could not tell lawyers how to defend their clients, and whether or not a personal meeting was necessary.
55. The Government further maintained that the applicant's claim was far-fetched. Ms A. had acquired sufficient knowledge of the case, and the applicant had not disagreed with her position on legal matters. To the Supreme Court he had declared that he had wished to know her "as a person". However, "personal relations were not of great importance to effective and adequate legal aid". Ms A. had all the necessary legal skills to defend the applicant.
(d) Personal attendance
56. The last arguments raised by the Government concerned the hearing
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