ut cases in which security concerns alone justify excluding the public from a trial are nevertheless rare (see Riepan v. Austria, No. 35115/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-XII). Admittedly, it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to protect the safety and security of the persons present in the courtroom and to respond to the threat of D.'s assassination. However, in the Court's view, the security measures should be narrowly tailored and comply with the principle of necessity. The judicial authorities should thoroughly consider all possible alternatives to ensure safety and security in the courtroom and give preference to a less strict measure over a stricter one when it can achieve the same purpose. The Court notes that it is regrettable that in the present case no such effort was made by the trial court. It did not explain why such measures as, for instance, installation of metal detectors or screening of the public entering the courtroom were insufficient in the circumstances of the case. Nor did it find that the state security system in place at the courthouse was inadequate to such an extent that an assassination attempt could not be prevented other than by completely closing the trial to the public.
30. Furthermore, the Court finds without merit the Government's argument that it was necessary to hold the trial at the remand prison to prevent any risk D.'s assassination might pose to the residents of the areas close to the courthouse and to exclude the possibility of assassination during the defendants' transport. There is nothing in the trial court's decision to suggest that those considerations were of any concern to the trial court.
31. Similarly, the Court is unconvinced that the protection of the interests of an alleged rape victim or relatives of the alleged rapist required the exclusion of the public from the entire trial. The Court concedes that the sensitive content of the testimony to be provided by the witnesses in question might call for certain limitations of the applicant's right to a public hearing. Nevertheless, it was the duty of the court to restrict the rights of the accused as little as possible. In the present case the Court discerns nothing in the materials in its possession to suggest that closing only part of the hearing, during which the witnesses would testify, would have jeopardised or impacted negatively on the clarity and accuracy of their testimony or infringed their privacy.
32. The Court also notes that, unlike the case of Volkov v. Russia where it accepted that the interests of justice required the exclusion of the public from the trial and where the trial court took the relevant decision after the prosecution and the defence had had an opportunity to submit their arguments on the point (see Volkov v. Russia, No. 64056/00, § 32, 4 December 2007), in the present case the trial court made the relevant decision in the absence of the parties to the proceedings.
33. In sum, the Court concludes that the trial court has failed to give due consideration to the applicant's right to a public hearing.
34. Finally, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the appeal hearing was public. However, as it has previously ruled on many occasions, the lack of a public hearing could not in any event be remedied by anything other than a complete re-hearing before the appellate court (see Riepan, cited above, § 40).
35. An examination of the facts of the present case reveals that the review carried out by the Supreme Court of Russia did not have the requisite scope. It is true that the appellate court was able to review the case as regards questions of law and fact and to reassess the sentence. However, apart from questioning the applicant, the court did not take any evidence, and in particular it did not hear the witnesses again. Similarly to its finding in Riepan, the Court considers it of little importan
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