aragraph 62 above), as well as any isolated incidents of threats of violence being put into practice, they could have adequately been dealt with through the prosecution of those responsible. However, it does not appear that the authorities in the present case reacted to the cleric's call for violence in any other way than banning the event he condemned. By relying on such blatantly unlawful calls as grounds for the ban, the authorities effectively endorsed the intentions of persons and organisations that clearly and deliberately intended to disrupt a peaceful demonstration in breach of the law and public order.
77. In the light of the above findings, the Court concludes that the Government failed to carry out an adequate assessment of the risk to the safety of the participants in the events and to public order. It reiterates that if every probability of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a demonstration were to warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing views on any question which offends the sensitivity of the majority opinion (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 107). In the present case, the Court cannot accept the Government's assertion that the threat was so great as to require such a drastic measure as banning the event altogether, let alone doing so repeatedly over a period of three years. Furthermore, it appears from the public statements made by the mayor of Moscow, as well as from the Government's observations, that if security risks played any role in the authorities' decision to impose the ban, they were in any event secondary to considerations of public morals.
78. The Court observes that the mayor of Moscow on many occasions expressed his determination to prevent gay parades and similar events from taking place, apparently because he considered them inappropriate (see paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 16 and 24 above). The Government in their observations also pointed out that such events should be banned as a matter of principle, because propaganda promoting homosexuality was incompatible with religious doctrines and the moral values of the majority, and could be harmful if seen by children or vulnerable adults.
79. The Court observes, however, that these reasons do not constitute grounds under domestic law for banning or otherwise restricting a public event. Accordingly, no such arguments were put forward in the domestic proceedings, which remained focused on security issues. The Court is not convinced that the Government may at this stage substitute one Convention-protected legitimate aim for another one which never formed part of the domestic balancing exercise. Moreover, it considers that in any event the ban was disproportionate to either of the two alleged aims.
80. The Court reiterates that the guarantees of Article 11 of the Convention apply to all assemblies except those where the organisers and participants have violent intentions or otherwise deny the foundations of a "democratic society" (see G. v. Germany, No. 13079/87, Commission decision of 6 March 1989, Decisions and Reports (DR) 60, p. 256, and Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 16 July 1980, DR 21, p. 138). As the Court stated in Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia (No. 10877/04, § 45, 23 October 2008): "any measures interfering with the freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles - however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities - do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it."
81. The Court further reiterates that it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majori
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