rgin of appreciation within which the authorities should be able to choose measures appropriate for maintaining public order. They referred to the cases of Barankevich v. Russia (No. 10519/03, 26 July 2007) and Plattform "{Arzte fur} das Leben" v. Austria (21 June 1988, Series A No. 139) for principles governing the authorities' conduct at public events marked by a high probability of violence. In the present case, the Government asserted that they could not have avoided banning the event, because no other measure could have adequately addressed the security risks. They further claimed that if the Court were to give an assessment different from that of the domestic authorities it would put itself in the position of a "court of fourth instance".
59. In addition to that, the Government submitted that the event in question had had to be banned for the protection of morals. They emphasised that any promotion of homosexuality was incompatible with the "religious doctrines for the majority of the population", as had been made clear in the statements by the religious organisations calling for the ban. They contended that allowing the gay parades would be perceived by believers as an intentional insult to their religious feelings and a "terrible debasement of their human dignity".
60. The Government relied on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guaranteed individuals respect for and protection of their religious and moral beliefs and the right to bring up their children in accordance with them. They claimed that authorising gay parades would breach the rights of those people whose religious and moral beliefs included a negative attitude towards homosexuality. They further noted that in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, §§ 52 and 56, Series A No. 295A) the Court had recognised the great role of religion in people's everyday life, which should be taken into account in order to prevent religious beliefs from becoming the subject of unreasonable and insulting accusations. They concluded on that basis that the State must take into account the requirements of the major religious associations and that "the democratic State must protect society from destructive influence on its moral fundamentals, and protect the human dignity of all citizens, including believers". In the present case, the ideas of the event organisers were not neutral to the rest of society, but had actually encroached on the rights, lawful interests and human dignity of believers.
61. The Government also alleged that there was no consensus between the Council of Europe member States as to the extent to which homosexuality was accepted in each country. According to them, "[s]uch relations are allowed in some countries, in other countries they are considerably restricted". For this reason they claimed that the domestic authorities were better informed as to what might insult believers in the respective communities. To illustrate this point they referred to the case of Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (22 October 1981, §§ 56 - 58, Series A No. 45), in which the Court had discussed the diversity of moral and cultural values in the context of criminal liability for homosexual conduct, which had existed at the material time in Northern Ireland, while stressing that they did not adhere to the conclusion arrived at by the Court in that case. They also cited at length the case of {Muller} and Others v. Switzerland (24 May 1988, Series A No. 133), where the Court had upheld measures by the authorities restricting general access to an exhibition of paintings depicting "crude sexual relations, particularly between people and animals". They suggested that gay parades should be viewed from the same standpoint, taking into account the interests of involuntary spectators, especially children. In their opinion, any form of c
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