of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov and Others, cited above, §§ 103 et seq.). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see, mutatis mutandis, Salman v. Turkey [GC], No. 21986/93, § 106, ECHR 2000-VII; {Tanrikulu} v. Turkey [GC], No. 23763/94, §§ 104 et seq., ECHR 1999-IV; and {Gul} v. Turkey, No. 22676/93, § 89, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.
41. Furthermore, the investigation must be expeditious. In cases examined under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness of the official investigation is at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Labita, cited above, §§ 133 et seq.). Consideration has been given to delays in the starting of investigations, delays in taking statements (see {Timurtas} v. Turkey, No. 23531/94, § 89, ECHR 2000-VI, and Tekin v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, § 67, Reports 1998-IV), and the length of time taken to complete an initial investigation (see Indelicato v. Italy, No. 31143/96, § 37, 18 October 2001).
42. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the authorities did carry out an inquiry into the applicant's allegations. The investigator at the prosecutor's office conducted it promptly and informed the applicant of the result without undue delay. The Court is not convinced, however, that the inquiry was sufficiently thorough to meet the requirements of Article 3.
43. As regards the thoroughness of the investigation, the Court observes that a number of significant omissions capable of undermining its reliability and effectiveness were, in fact, identified by a domestic court at the first level of jurisdiction. The Court accepts the District Court's findings of 7 June 2004 (see paragraph 15 above) that, when arriving at his decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers, the investigator confined himself to questioning the police officers involved. Even assuming that the applicant had indeed refused to talk to the investigator, the Court finds the latter's effort for establishment of the facts insufficient. In particular, at no point did he organise a confrontation between the applicant and the police officers to verify the truthfulness of the testimony provided by the alleged perpetrators.
44. Furthermore, the investigator, as the District Court indicated, failed to determine the cause of the applicant's injuries and to account for the inconsistencies in his own reconstruction of the events of 22 and 23 April 2004. In particular, the investigator's findings that the applicant had actively resisted arrest and questioning and that he had even broken his handcuffs lack any basis in evidence except for the statements made by the alleged perpetrators. As the District Court noted, no attempt was made by the investigator to examine the available physical evidence, such as the broken handcuffs or the torn shirt the applicant was wearing on 22 April 2004.
45. The subsequent judicial proceedings do not seem to have rectified the omissions of the investigator's inquiry. The decision taken by the District Court on 7 June 2004 was quashed on appeal and the court, considering the applicant's complaint anew, did not discern any flaws in the inquiry and validated the investigator's findings.
46. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court
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