the prosecutor and the courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The prosecutor had questioned the applicant, the guards and the medical personnel. He had not considered it necessary to inspect the alleged crime scene. The prosecutor's findings had been confirmed by the courts. The investigation carried out by the authorities in response to the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment had been effective as required by the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.
36. The applicant maintained his complaints. He denied that he had put up any resistance to the guards. Given his weight of less than 60 kg and his height of 1.65 m, it had been physically impossible for him to effectively resist four officers, one of whom had been more than two metres tall. Nor had the guards had any injuries. In his view, the use of the rubber truncheon against him had been excessive and unnecessary. It had been retaliatory in nature and amounted to torture. The applicant further contended that the ensuing inquiry had not been effective or thorough. Nor had it been complete. The prosecutor had not questioned the applicant's representative or commissioned an independent forensic medical examination of the applicant's injuries.
A. Admissibility
37. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Alleged ill-treatment
38. The Court has stated on many occasions that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct (see, among many other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV, and Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V).
39. In the context of detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, No. 4353/03, § 73, ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Sarban v. Moldova, No. 3456/05, § 77, 4 October 2005; and Mouisel v. France, No. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Sheydayev v. Russia, No. 65859/01, § 59, 7 December 2006, and Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 38, Series A No. 336). The burden of proof rests on the Government to demonstrate with convincing arguments that the use of force, which resulted in the applicant's injuries, was not excessive (see, for example, Dzwonkowski v. Poland, No. 46702/99, § 51, 12 April 2007).
40. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that it is not disputed by the parties that on 30 July 2005 the applicant sustained the injuries as a result of the use of force against him by the remand prison personnel. The Court takes cognisance of the Government's argument that those injuries were not serious and did not cause any "health problem". However, this fact alone cannot rule out a possibility that the treatment was severe enough to be considered inhuman or degrading. The Court considers that the degree of bruising noted by the remand prison paramedics indicated that the applicant's injuries were, as such, sufficiently serious. Accordingly, the question before the Court in the instant case is whether the State should be held responsible
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