5 April 2005 amounted in practice to a deprivation of liberty, and that Article 5 § 1 applies to his case ratione materiae. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that it has already found that deprivation of liberty effected in a moving vehicle may be regarded as "detention" (see Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986, § 59, Series A No. 111) and sees no reason not to accept that the applicant was in fact placed in detention within the meaning attributed to this term in its case-law.
142. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
143. The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention protects the right to liberty and security. This right is of primary importance "in a democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention (see, amongst many other authorities, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 65, Series A No. 12; Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], No. 71503/01, § 169, ECHR 2004-II; and Ladent v. Poland, No. 11036/03, § 45, ECHR 2008-...).
144. All persons are entitled to the protection of this right, that is to say, not to be deprived, or continue to be deprived, of their liberty, save in accordance with the conditions specified in paragraph 1 of Article 5 (see Medvedyev and Others, cited above, § 77). Where the "lawfulness" of detention is in issue, including the question whether "a procedure prescribed by law" has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law. It requires at the same time that any deprivation of liberty be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Bozano, cited above, § 54, and Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], No. 21906/04, § 116, ECHR 2008-...).
145. No detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1, the notion of "arbitrariness" in this context extending beyond the lack of conformity with national law. While the Court has not previously formulated a global definition as to what types of conduct on the part of the authorities might constitute "arbitrariness" for the purposes of Article 5 § 1, key principles have been developed on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the notion of arbitrariness in the context of Article 5 varies to a certain extent depending on the type of detention involved (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], No. 11364/03, § 77, ECHR 2009-...).
146. For example, the Court has already established that detention will be "arbitrary" where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities (see Bozano, cited above, § 59); where the domestic authorities have neglected to attempt to apply the relevant legislation correctly (see Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 47, Reports 1996-III); or where judicial authorities have authorised detention for a prolonged period of time without giving any grounds for doing so in their decisions (see {Stasaitis} v. Lithuania, No. 47679/99, § 67, 21 March 2002).
147. The Court will now examine whether the applicant's detention was free from arbitrariness.
148. Referring to its above findings as to the establishment of the facts of the present case (see paragraph 115 above), the Court considers that it is deeply regrettable that such opaque methods were employed by State agents as these practices could not only unsettle legal certainty and instil a feeling of personal insecurity in individuals, but could also generally risk undermining public respect for and confidence in the domestic authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, No. 37048/04, § 56, ECHR 2009-...).
149. The Court further emphasises that the applicant's detention was not based on a decision issued pur
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