he Vladimir Regional Court.
32. The applicant failed to submit his observations but maintained his complaint in further correspondence with the Court.
33. The Court reiterates that the phrase "established by law" covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a "tribunal" but also the composition of the bench in each case (see Buscarini v. San Marino (dec.), No. 31657/96, 4 May 2000; and Posokhov v. Russia, No. 63486/00, § 39, ECHR 2003-IV).
34. Having regard to the materials submitted by the Government, the Court is satisfied that the lay judges G. and Ka. were elected to their office at the Vladimir Regional Court in accordance with the relevant law at the material time and were entitled to continue their service following several extensions of their terms of office. The Court also accepts that the Vladimir Regional Court was not in possession of the lists of new lay judges until September 2002 and was thus operating based on the old list.
35. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that there is no evidence that the tribunal that convicted the applicant on 29 April 2002 had not been established by law.
36. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
on account of excessive length of proceedings
37. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 that the criminal proceedings against him had been excessively long. The relevant part of the provision reads as follows:
"In the determination of... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]... tribunal..."
A. Admissibility
38. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
39. The Government disagreed with the complaint. Referring to their argument that on 15 January 1999 the applicant was already in detention on account of a different criminal investigation against him, they suggested that the length of the examination of the case be calculated from 2 July 2001 when the case was forwarded by the investigation authorities to the trial court. They further submitted, without supplying specific examples, that the trial had been delayed by the applicant's representative's requests to study the case, his disruption of the court order, the legal counsels' illnesses, execution of court orders for delivery of witnesses, and complexity of the case. In addition, there had been no periods of court inactivity.
40. The applicant failed to submit his observations but maintained his complaint in further correspondence with the Court.
41. The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings starts from the moment that a person is substantially affected by actions taken by the prosecuting authorities as a result of the suspicion against him. It has been the Court's long-standing practice to consider an arrest as such a moment (see Pierre de Varga-Hirsch v. France (dec.), No. 9559/81, 9 May 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 33, p. 158).
42. The Court recalls that in their letter of 30 April 1999 (see paragraph 6 above) the Vladimir Regional prosecutor's office confirmed that the applicant had been arrested on 15 January 1999. It further recalls that the applicant's sentence under the conviction of 29 April 2002 (see paragraph 17 above) started to run from 15 January 1999. The Government failed to submit any evidence that would refute the argument that the ap
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