alidity of this judgment was restored. Yet, no redress was offered for the losses sustained (see paragraph 59 below). Therefore the applicant may still claim to be a victim.
38. The Court concludes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 6 of the Convention
(a) Supervisory review: legal certainty
39. The Government argued that the first set of re-trial proceedings had been compatible with the Convention since the Presidium had only changed the way of enforcement, but not the judgment of 5 July 2000 in substance. The applicant maintained his complaint.
40. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental errors. The mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination (see Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51 - 52).
41. The Court reiterates that it has frequently found violations of the principle of legal certainty and of the right to a court in the supervisory-review proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in force before 2003 (see, among other authorities, Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51 - 56; Volkova v. Russia, No. 48758/99, §§ 34 - 36, 5 April 2005; Roseltrans v. Russia, No. 60974/00, §§ 27 - 28, 21 July 2005).
42. In the present case the final and binding judgment was amended to the applicant's detriment on 10 August 2001 upon an application by a State official, who was not a party to the case. Furthermore, no fundamental error has been demonstrated by the Government to justify the modification of this final and binding judgment. The Presidium's disagreement with the assessment made by the inferior court is not in itself an exceptional circumstance warranting the modification of the judgment to the applicant's detriment (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
43. The Government's assertion that on 10 August 2001 the Presidium had not changed the substance of the judgment of 5 July 2000, is not persuasive. The Court observes that the judgment of 5 July 2000 presupposed that the applicant should have been provided with housing immediately (as later reaffirmed by the Presidium on 12 November 2003, see paragraph 24 above). The amendment made on 10 August 2001 entailed necessity to comply with the order of precedence. Apparently there is a difference between an immediate and a conditioned order to provide housing (see Zheleznyakovy v. Russia (dec.), No. 3180/03, ECHR 15 March 2007). Hence that amendment frustrated the applicant's reliance on this final and binding judgment and his legitimate expectation to receive housing without delay.
44. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Supervisory review: procedural issues
45. As to the alleged violation of the applicant's procedural rights in the supervisory review proceedings, the Court considers that given the finding of a violation by the very use of supervisory review, it is unnecessary to examine this complaint (see Ryabykh, cited above, § 59).
2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
46. The Court considers that the applicant's claim to a "social tenancy agreement" was sufficiently established in the judgment of 5 July 2000 to constitute a "possession" falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Malinovskiy v. Russia, No. 41302/02, § 46, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts)). The judgment thus created an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Vasilopoulou v. Greece, No. 47541/99, § 22, 21 March 2002, and Mali
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