periods of detention within one set of criminal proceedings can be classified as "pending investigation" or "pending trial", for instance when the trial judge returns the case to the prosecutor (see, among others, Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia, No. 23691/06, § 91, 18 June 2009).
42. Since the order of 30 December 2004 did not cite any legal basis, it is unclear whether rules of Article 109 or 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied during the contested period of time. The Court notes the Government's submission that the period from 30 December 2004 to 11 January 2005, when the prosecutor received the file, was covered by Article 255 of the CCrP. They argued, in other words, that until the date of receipt of the file by the prosecutor, the applicant was detained "pending trial" and could be held in such detention for up to six months. The Court observes, however, that the order of 30 December 2004 did not refer to Article 255 of the CCrP. The remand judge did, however, cite Article 237 of the CCrP, which required that, after receipt of the case file from the judge, the prosecutor should comply with his or her instructions within five days. That was not done in the present case. Indeed, from 30 December 2004 until an unspecified point before 11 January 2005, when the Dmitrovgrad town prosecutor received the file, the applicant's case was neither with the trial judge nor with the prosecuting authority.
43. The Court further notes the Government's argument that the five-day time-limit for remedying the violations by the prosecution had started running from the date of receipt of the file by a prosecutor. However, while the prosecutor was indeed bound by the five-day time-limit once in possession of the case file, the period preceding the receipt appeared to be virtually unlimited, given the absence of sufficiently precise rules concerning the legal grounds for detention between the return of the case to the prosecutor and the receipt of the file by the prosecution authority.
44. Therefore, the applicant was placed in a situation of uncertainty as to the exact duration of his continued detention at that stage (see, mutatis mutandis, Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia, cited above, § 92).
45. Second, the Court observes that on 30 December 2004 the Town Court gave no reasons for its decision to remand the applicant in custody. In this respect the Court has already held in a number of cases that the absence of any grounds given by judicial authorities in their decisions authorising detention is incompatible with the principle of protection from arbitrariness enshrined in Article 5 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Nakhmanovich v. Russia, No. 55669/00, §§ 70 - 71, 2 March 2006, and {Stasaitis} v. Lithuania, No. 47679/99, § 67, 21 March 2002). In the present case, the applicant was in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds for his detention from 30 December 2004 to 13 January 2005, the date on which the court re-examined the provisional measure of restraint in respect of him.
46. Third, it appears from the case materials that the domestic authorities dealing with the case did not interpret the detention order of 30 December 2004 uniformly. Indeed, as it clearly follows from the prosecutor's decision of 12 January 2005 to apply for an extension of the applicant's detention, the prosecution authority itself had considered that the applicant's pre-trial detention was to expire on 14 January 2005 (see paragraph 14 above). Likewise - and contrary to the Government's submission - it appears from the prosecutor's decision of 12 January 2005 to reinstate the time-limits for the investigation (see paragraph 13 above) that the five-day time-limit set out for remedying the violations had expired on 4 January 2005, which was within five days of the date of the delivery of the respective court decision.
47. Having regard to the inconsistent and mutually exclusive
> 1 2 3 ... 5 6 7
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
