039; jurisdiction.
59. Secondly, it recalls that the aggregate length of the time it took to complete four technical examinations of varying complexity was almost three years. While the Court is not in possession of the relevant documents and cannot assess the necessity and complexity of these examinations, it is mindful that the authorities substantively acknowledged the fact of the delays, as evidenced in the correspondence between the domestic court and the State forensic examinations bureau. In particular, it takes cognisance of the District Court's procrastination in submitting all necessary documents to the bureau and the latter's repeated references to a heavy workload. The Court recalls in this respect that the principal responsibility for the delay due to the expert opinions rests ultimately with the State (see Capuano v. Italy, 25 June 1987, § 32, Series A No. 119). Accordingly, this period is also imputable to the State.
60. Furthermore, the Court observes that the first-instance judgments in the applicant's case were set aside four times either by the appeal or by the supervisory-review courts for erroneous application of the substantive law. In this respect the Court reiterates that the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory. The right to have one's claim examined within a reasonable time would be devoid of all sense if domestic courts examined a case endlessly, even if at the end the length of proceedings per instance did not appear particularly excessive (see, mutatis mutandis, Svetlana Orlova v. Russia, No. 4487/04, § 47, 30 July 2009).
61. Although the Court is not in a position to analyse the juridical quality of the domestic courts' decisions, it considers that multiple repetition of re-examination orders within one set of proceedings may disclose a deficiency in the judicial system (see Wierciszewska v. Poland, No. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003; Matica v. Romania, No. 19567/02, § 24, 2 November 2006; and Falimonov v. Russia, No. 11549/02, § 58, 25 March 2008). The fact that the domestic courts heard the case several times did not absolve them from complying with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 (see Litoselitis v. Greece, No. 62771/00, § 32, 5 February 2004; and Svetlana Orlova, cited above, § 50).
62. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the failure of the domestic authorities to promptly refer the applicant to a competent court, delays in completing the technical examinations and repeated referrals of the case to the first instance significantly contributed to the length of the examination of the applicant's case.
63. Regarding what was at stake for the applicant, the Court observes that, according to the findings of the State experts and domestic courts, the applicant's only housing had indeed suffered a grave damage that made it hardly suitable for living (see para. 46 above). Taking into additional consideration the applicant's advanced age, the Court is of the opinion that those circumstances required a particular diligence on the part of the domestic authorities.
64. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the length of the proceedings in the present case was excessive. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of proceedings.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
on account of non-enforcement
65. The applicant also complained that the non-enforcement of the judgment of 22 November 2007 in the part ordering construction of the drainage system in the vicinity of her house breached Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The relevant part of the provision reads as follows:
"In the determination of
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