112. The Court must moreover ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court stresses that, where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person - if need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see {Jecius} v. Lithuania, No. 34578/97, § 56, ECHR 2000-IX, and Baranowski v. Poland, No. 28358/95, §§ 50 - 52, ECHR 2000-III).
(a) The applicant's detention from 26 June 2003 to 19 February 2004
113. The Court observes that in the period from 26 June 2003 to 19 February 2004 the applicant's detention was extended by the Regional Court on three occasions on the ground of the gravity of the charges against him and his co-defendants (see the relevant domestic law provisions in paragraph 58 above).
114. The trial court acted within its powers in making the above-mentioned decisions, and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid or unlawful under domestic law, or that they were inappropriate for the purpose of Article 5 § 1 (c). The question whether the reasons for the decisions were sufficient and relevant is analysed below in connection with the issue of compliance with Article 5 § 3.
115. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention in respect of the detention orders issued in the period from 26 June 2003 to 19 February 2004.
(b) The applicant's detention from 19 February to 17 May 2004
116. The Court notes that on 19 February 2004 the Regional Court, comprising a presiding judge and two lay judges, citing the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his co-defendants, extended the applicant's detention by three months, until 19 May 2004. This period of the applicant's detention ended on 17 May 2004, when he was convicted.
117. As regards this period of detention, the applicant contested the power of the Regional Court to extend his detention, claiming that as of 1 January 2004 the domestic law no longer provided for the participation of lay judges in the administration of criminal justice. The Court's task is, therefore, to determine whether the applicant's detention in the relevant period was carried out "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law". To this effect the Court will turn to the domestic law (see paragraph 111 above).
118. The Court observes at the outset that the domestic law does not contain an explicit provision stipulating that the questions of application and extension of a custodial measure are determined by the same bench that examines the criminal case on the merits. The Court notes, however, that in the present case the extension of the applicant's detention on 19 February 2004 was authorised by the same bench which subsequently delivered the judgment in the applicant's case on 17 May 2004.
119. The Court further observes that the trial bench in question was composed under the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, which provided that serious crimes were to be examined by a professional judge and two lay judges (see paragraph 67 above). While the proceedings were pending before the trial court, the new Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force. Although the new Code abolished the participation of lay judges, it maintained the principle that the trial bench should remain unchanged t
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