e in a place of their choosing. The mechanism would also have to offer means of ensuring that immediate remedial action is taken, in the event of it coming to light that assurances given were not being respected."
THE LAW
I. The Government's preliminary objection
A. The parties' submissions
96. The Government contended that the application should be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae. They submitted that the applicant had not been extradited by the Russian authorities to Uzbekistan, the measure at issue had not been applied to him, his extradition had been suspended and therefore he could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3.
97. The applicant contested the objection and submitted that there was a high risk of his ill-treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan, that the decision to extradite him had been finalised by the Russian authorities and that his extradition had been suspended only due to the application of the interim measures by the Court.
B. The Court's assessment
98. The Court reiterates that an individual may no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention where the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, the breach of the Convention and afforded redress (see, among many authorities, Achour v. France (dec.), No. 67335/01, 11 March 2004, where the authorities annulled the expulsion order against the applicant, and Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III).
99. As to the specific category of cases involving expulsion measures, the Court has consistently held that an applicant cannot claim to be the "victim" of a measure which is not enforceable (see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, § 46, 27 August 1992, Series A No. 241-B; see also Pellumbi v. France (dec.), No. 65730/01, 18 January 2005, and Etanji v. France (dec.), No. 60411/00, 1 March 2005). It has adopted the same stance in cases where execution of the deportation or extradition order has been stayed indefinitely or otherwise deprived of legal effect and where any decision by the authorities to proceed with deportation can be appealed against before the relevant courts (see Kalantari v. Germany (striking out), No. 51342/99, §§ 55 - 56, ECHR 2001-X, and Mehemi v. France (No. 2), No. 53470/99, § 54, ECHR 2003-IV; see also Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, No. 36378/02, § 355, ECHR 2005-III; {Andric} v. Sweden (dec.), No. 45917/99, 23 February 1999; Benamar and Others v. France (dec.), No. 42216/98, 14 November 2000; and Djemailji v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 13531/03, 18 January 2005).
100. The present application concerns the applicant's extradition to Uzbekistan where, according to him, he would face a serious risk of ill-treatment by the authorities on account of his political and religious beliefs. The Court observes, firstly, that the decision concerning the applicant's extradition was finalised by the Russian authorities in December 2008; and secondly, that the decision not to extradite the applicant until further notice from the European Court was taken by the Russian authorities in November 2008 only because of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Clearly, the fact that the applicant had not been handed over to the Uzbek authorities did not constitute any acknowledgment, whether explicit or implicit, on the part of the Russian authorities that there had been or would have been a violation of Article 3 or that the applicant's extradition order had been deprived of its legal effect.
101. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant may claim to be a "victim" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.
II. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention
102
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