of detention on remand (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, §§ 80 and 81, 26 July 2001). This is particularly true in the Russian legal system, where the characterisation in law of the facts - and thus the sentence faced by the applicant - is determined by the prosecution without judicial review of whether the evidence obtained supports a reasonable suspicion that the applicant has committed the alleged offence (see Khudoyorov, cited above, § 180).
149. The Government have laid particular emphasis on the concerted or organised nature of the alleged criminal activities. Indeed, the applicant was charged with membership of a criminal gang, which is an offence under the Criminal Code, and with the commission of offences classified as aggravated robbery within such an organised group. As the Court has previously observed, the existence of a general risk flowing from the organised nature of criminal activities may be accepted as the basis for detention at the initial stages of the proceedings (see {Kucera} v. Slovakia, No. 48666/99, § 95, ECHR 2007-... (extracts), and Celejewski v. Poland, No. 17584/04, §§ 37 and 38, 4 May 2006). The Court cannot agree, however, that the nature of those activities could form the basis of the detention orders at an advanced stage of the proceedings. Neither was the Court provided with any evidence which would support the Government's own submission on that point. Thus, the above circumstances alone could not constitute a sufficient basis for holding the applicant for such a long period of time.
150. The other grounds for the applicant's continued detention were the domestic courts' findings that the applicant could abscond or pervert the course of justice and reoffend.
151. As to the domestic courts' findings that the applicant was liable to pervert the course of justice, in particular by putting pressure on witnesses, the Court notes that at the initial stages of the investigation the risk that an accused person may pervert the course of justice could justify keeping him or her in custody. However, after the evidence has been collected, that ground becomes less justified. In particular, as regards the risk of pressure being put on witnesses, the Court reiterates that for the domestic courts to demonstrate that a substantial risk of collusion existed and continued to exist during the entire period of the applicant's detention, it did not suffice merely to refer to an abstract risk unsupported by any evidence. They should have analysed other pertinent factors, such as the advancement of the investigation or judicial proceedings, the applicant's personality, his behaviour before and after the arrest and any other specific indications justifying the fear that he might abuse his regained liberty by carrying out acts aimed at falsification or destruction of evidence or manipulation of witnesses (see W. v. Switzerland, 26 January 1993, § 36, Series A No. 254-A).
152. Furthermore, the Court notes that the pre-trial investigation in respect of the applicant was completed in January 2005. Thereafter, he remained in custody for one year and nine months, for most of which the proceedings were pending before the trial court. It thus appears that the domestic authorities had sufficient time to take statements from witnesses in a manner which could have excluded any doubt as to their veracity and would have eliminated the need to continue the applicant's deprivation of liberty on that ground (see, for similar reasoning, Solovyev v. Russia, No. 2708/02, § 115, 24 May 2007). Furthermore, the Court observes that the national courts did not specify why and to what extent such risk existed in relation to the applicant as compared to the other detained co-accused.
153. The Court therefore considers that the national authorities were not entitled to regard the circumstances of the case as justification for using the risk of collusio
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