ry 2008).
77. However, in the present case the Court has little evidence on which to draw such conclusions as the account of the events submitted by the applicant is based entirely on the summary of third persons' anonymous statements. In addition, the applicant's statements regarding certain aspects of the events which she made before the investigators and the Court differ substantially, which gives reason to doubt the coherence of her version (see paragraphs 8 - 11 and 30 above). In addition, from the submitted materials it follows that the applicant raised the issue of the possible involvement of State agents in her son's abduction with the domestic investigation only after she had lodged her application with the Court (see paragraph 58 above). In such circumstances the Court considers that it cannot regard the applicant's account as reliable evidence.
78. Moreover, the mere fact that the perpetrators were armed, masked and in camouflage uniforms does not necessarily mean that they were State servicemen. The anonymous evidence to which the applicant referred in her statements to the Court did not contain any indication to the effect that the camouflage uniforms worn by the armed men bore any insignia of the type that should normally appear on the uniforms of State agents, or that the perpetrators had acted during the abduction as an organised group with a chain of command. Camouflage uniforms with no insignia could have been obtained by persons not belonging to the military via various, possibly illegal channels.
79. The information at the Court's disposal does not warrant the conclusion that the armed men had driven around in military vehicles. The applicant has never alleged, either before the domestic investigation or before the Court, that anyone saw any military vehicles in the vicinity of the crime scene with his or her own eyes. Given that the perpetrators used regular civilian vehicles, the Court considers that they could have moved around the town unbeknown to the authorities with greater ease than, for example, a group of armed men riding in an armoured personnel carrier.
80. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the applicant did not provide information about her encounter with the abductors' convoy on the day following the abduction (see paragraphs 9 - 11 above) when questioned by the district prosecutor's office. The Court is not persuaded that the investigators should have asked the applicant leading questions to establish, for example, whether she had seen the abductors on the following day given that it did not occur to her to disclose to the investigation all the relevant information at her disposal of her own motion.
81. Accordingly, the information in the Court's possession does not suffice to establish that the perpetrators belonged to the security forces or that a security operation had been carried out in respect of Said-Magamed Tovsultanov.
82. To sum up, it has not been established to the required standard of proof - "beyond reasonable doubt" - that State agents were implicated in the kidnapping of Said-Magamed Tovsultanov; nor does the Court consider that the burden of proof can be entirely shifted to the Government.
III. Alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention
83. The applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention that her son had disappeared after having been detained by Russian servicemen and that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. Article 2 reads:
"1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this art
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