he investigation of the kidnapping
90. The Court has on many occasions stated that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention also requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force. It has developed a number of guiding principles to be followed for an investigation to comply with the Convention's requirements (for a summary of these principles see Bazorkina v. Russia, No. 69481/01, §§ 117 - 119, 27 July 2006).
91. In the present case, the kidnapping of Said-Magamed Tovsultanov was investigated. The Court must assess whether that investigation met the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.
92. The Court notes at the outset that the documents from the investigation file were disclosed by the Government only partially. It therefore has to assess the effectiveness of the investigation on the basis of the documents submitted by the parties and the information about its progress presented by the Government.
93. The Court notes that the authorities were made aware of the crime by the applicant's submission on 14 February 2005, that is, seven months after the events in question and that the official criminal investigation was instituted on 2 June 2005, that is, almost a year after Said-Magamed Tovsultanov's abduction. It is clear that the applicant herself contributed to the belated initiation of the investigation, having officially informed the authorities about the abduction with a significant delay.
94. The Court notes that within the first several months of the investigation a number of steps had been taken by the prosecutor's office. Several witnesses were questioned, the crime scene was inspected, and numerous requests were forwarded to various law-enforcement authorities in different regions of the Northern Caucasus. However, after having taken the initial necessary measures to solve the crime, the investigators became inactive and failed to follow up on important investigating leads by questioning the officers who had been on duty at the "Volga-20" checkpoint on 14 June 2004 (see paragraph 47 above) or requesting the Chechen law-enforcement authorities to confirm the identity and the service documents of captain V.K., who had crossed the checkpoint on that day and had been driving a vehicle matching the description of the abductors' cars (see paragraph 49 above). In addition, without having taken a number of other investigating measures (see paragraph 55 above) the prosecutor's office suspended the investigation for almost 3 years and 6 months (see paragraphs 54 - 55 above) and resumed it only after the communication of the application by the Court. It is obvious that these investigative measures, if they were to produce any meaningful results, should have been taken as soon as the investigation commenced. Such delays, for which there has been no explanation in the instant case, not only demonstrate the authorities' failure to act of their own motion but also constitute a breach of the obligation to exercise exemplary diligence and promptness in dealing with such a serious matter (see {Oneryildiz} v. Turkey [GC], No. 48939/99, § 94, ECHR 2004-XII).
95. The Court also notes that even though the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation concerning the abduction of her son, she was only informed of the suspension and resumption of the proceedings, and not of any other significant developments. Accordingly, the investigators failed to ensure that the investigation received the required level of public scrutiny, or to safeguard the interests of the next of kin in the proceedings.
96. The Government argued that the applicant could have sought judicial review of the decisions of the investigating authorities in the context of the exhaustion of domestic remedies but she h
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