reasonable, having regard to the applicant's numerous incidents of illness, his requests to adjourn court hearings and to remit the case for further investigation, as well as his application for supervisory review after the first set of proceedings. They also argued that a particular notice should be made of the fact that the applicant had not been detained pending trial.
43. The applicant contested the Government's arguments. In particular, he alleged that the de facto criminal investigation against him had been opened on 21 December 1998 and that the court had remitted the case for further investigation at the prosecutor's motions. He also noted that the cumulative length of his sick leaves of 42 days could not justify the length of the criminal proceedings against him.
44. The Court is satisfied that the criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced on 20 September 1999. Contrary to the applicant's submission, questioning him as a witness before this date did not amount to a formal charge. Even assuming that the authorities had suspected him of the wrongdoing, the applicant did not demonstrate that he had been substantially affected by it.
45. The Court observes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant lasted from 20 September 1999 until 25 January 2005, which spanned the investigation stage and the judicial proceedings, where the courts reviewed the case three times at two levels of jurisdiction. However, the period from 23 April to 28 November 2002 has to be excluded from the overall length as the case was being examined on application for supervisory review and not pending. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration amounted approximately to four years and nine months.
46. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the applicant's conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities (see, among many other authorities, {Pelissier} and Sassi v. France [GC], No. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
47. The Court observes that the present case was not complex, having involved a charge of one count concerning a single incident.
48. As regards the applicant's conduct, the Court takes cognisance of the Government's submission that the proceedings were mainly adjourned on account of the applicant's illness, his counsel's other commitments and the defence's requests to summon additional witnesses. The Court accepts that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking advantage of the procedural rights available to him. At the same time it is of the opinion that the State cannot bear the responsibility for this either. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a cumulative delay of one year and eight months can be attributable to the applicant.
49. As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Court is mindful of the fact that a delay of one year and four months was caused by judicial consideration of the prosecutor's three motions to remit the case for further investigation, only one of which was supported by the applicant. The authorities' omissions that subsequently led to such an investigation also contributed to this delay.
50. However, it notes that with the exception of this delay the authorities demonstrated sufficient diligence in handling the proceedings. The hearings were scheduled regularly and the adjournments, as noted above, were normally for reasons not attributable to the court. It also recalls that the domestic courts examined the merits of the case three times at two levels of jurisdiction.
51. Regard being had to the overall diligence displayed by the authorities, the substantial delays attributable to the applicant and the levels of jurisdiction involved, the Court considers that th
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