To hold otherwise would have deprived them of any practical meaning, other than the simple "rubber-stamping" of the judgment in the applicant's criminal case.
45. The Government acknowledged that the notification had not reached the applicant until 13 July 2001, two days after the hearing. Therefore, it was not disputed between the parties that at the hearing of 11 July 2001 the applicant had no opportunity to present his case in any form whatsoever: personally or through a representative, orally or in writing.
46. The Government explained that the belated notification of the hearing to the applicant had been due to his transferral from one detention facility to another. They blamed the postal service for that delay and maintained that the authorities should not be held responsible for it. However, their argument is not convincing.
47. First, the Government did not specify for how long the notification was in the hands of the postal service. Therefore, it is possible that some of the delay is attributable to the administrations of remand prison IZ-39/1 and correctional colony OM-216/13.
48. Second, the authorities knew that the applicant was in a remand prison. On 5 June 2001 his conviction had entered into legal force and, like any other convicted criminal, he had waited to be transferred to a correctional institution. The courts could not have ignored this fact when calculating how much time was needed for a notification to reach him.
49. Third, the court sent the notification to the applicant's last known address, to the remand prison. However, the law clearly required the court secretary to check at the beginning of the process whether the notification had been received by the defendant (see Article 151 of the old CCP, cited above). It is unclear whether the administration of the remand prison had informed the court of the change of the applicant's address owing to his transferral to the correctional colony (see Article 109 of the CCP). Be it as it may, the authorities showed a manifest lack of diligence and proceeded with the case without checking whether the applicant had been duly notified of the case against him.
50. The Court concludes that the hearing of 11 July 2001 was not in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court observes that the proceedings should always be examined as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to examine to what extent the subsequent proceedings were capable of restoring the applicant's right to a fair hearing.
(b) Hearings of 6 September and 10 October 2001
51. The Court observes that the new hearing of the applicant's case took place on 6 September 2001. At that hearing the court examined the applicant's request for the reopening of the case. The applicant was able to submit his written observations; however, he was not present personally. Furthermore, he appealed against the decision not to reopen the case and in his appeal he was again able to state his position on the case. From that the Government concluded that the applicant had been able to "present his case" and, therefore, the hearings of 6 September and 10 October were in compliance with Article 6 of the Convention.
52. Even assuming that the applicant's "effective participation" in the proceedings was thereby secured, the Court does not find that the applicant was able to present his case on an equal footing with the opposing party. The applicant's requests for leave to appear were denied or ignored on the ground that the domestic law did not make provision for convicted persons to be brought from correctional colonies to the place where their civil claim was being heard. In contrast, the opposite party attended both hearings before the Gusevskiy Town Court and was free to attend the hearing before the court of appeal. In such circumstances the Court finds th
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