Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 29.04.2010 «Дело Юрий Яковлев (Yuriy Yakovlev) против России» [англ.]

not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require him to be released provisionally once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (see Vlasov v. Russia, No. 78146/01, § 104, 12 June 2008, with further references).
65. The Court further observes that it falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that in a given case the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable length of time. To this end they must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the evidence given by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 152, ECHR 2000-IV).
66. The arguments for and against release must not be "general and abstract" (see Smirnova v. Russia, Nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 63, ECHR 2003-IX). Where the law provides for a presumption in respect of factors relevant to the grounds for continued detention, the existence of the specific factors outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty must be convincingly demonstrated (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, § 84 in fine, 26 July 2001).
67. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita, cited above, § 153).
(b) Application of the general principles to the present case
68. The Court notes that the applicant was held in custody from 3 July 2007 until his conviction on 12 August 2009. A pre-trial detention of this length - over two years - is a matter of concern for the Court. It observes that during that period the domestic courts extended the applicant's detention a number of times. In their decisions they consistently relied on the gravity of the charges as the main factor and on the applicant's potential to abscond, pervert the course of justice and reoffend.
69. As regards the courts' reliance on the gravity of the charges as the decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot of itself serve to justify long periods of detention (see Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral v. Poland, No. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov, cited above, § 81). This is particularly true in the Russian legal system, where the characterisation in law of the facts - and thus the sentence faced by the applicant - is determined by the prosecution without judicial review of whether the evidence obtained supports a reasonable suspicion that the applicant has committed the alleged offence (see Khudoyorov v. Russia, No. 6847/02, § 180, ECHR 2005-X).
70. The other grounds for the applicant's continued detention were the domestic courts' findings that the applicant could abscond, pervert the course of justice and reoffend. The Court reiter



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