B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
65. The Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this part of the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court considers therefore that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
2. Merits
66. With regard to judicial decisions, the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention. In particular, the Court is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by the domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, among other authorities, Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, § 45, Series A No. 140).
67. As regards Article 6 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The Court's task under the Convention is not to give a ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (see Doorson v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1996, § 67, Reports 1996-II, and Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 April 1997, § 50, Reports 1997-III). All the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but they must not infringe the rights of the defence (see {Ludi} v. Switzerland, judgment of 15 June 1992, § 49, Series A No. 238).
68. Bearing in mind the above principles, the Court has first examined the applicant's grievances concerning the preliminary investigation in his criminal case and the trial by a jury (paragraph 62 above). The applicant, who was represented, was afforded an adequate opportunity to present his argument and evidence, as well as to contest the prosecution's arguments and evidence in adversarial proceedings (paragraphs 15 - 22 above). The available material before the Court does not disclose that any alleged violation was such as to impair the overall fairness of the proceedings under Article 6 of the Convention.
69. As regards the appeal proceedings, the manner of application of Article 6 to proceedings before courts of appeal depends on the special features of the proceedings involved; account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order and of the role of the appellate court therein (see Ekbatani v. Sweden, 26 May 1988, § 27, Series A No. 134, and Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 56, Series A No. 115). Indeed, even where an appeal court has full jurisdiction to review the case on questions both of fact and of law, Article 6 does not always require a right to a public hearing and a fortiori a right to be present in person (see Kamasinski v. Austria, 19 December 1989, § 106, Series A No. 168, and Fejde v. Sweden, 29 October 1991, § 31, Series A No. 212-C). Regard must be had in assessing this question to, inter alia, the special features of the proceedings involved and the manner in which the defence's interests were presented and protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of the issues to be decided by it (see Helmers v. Sweden, 29 October 1991, §§ 31 - 32, Series A No. 212-
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