vember 2007). Therefore, in the present case the applicant's own conduct is an important element which should be assessed among other relevant factors.
38. Before addressing this argument of the Government it is necessary to rule upon the facts of the case, which are disputed between the parties. Whereas the Government alleged that the applicant had not complained about the taking of his glasses until December 1998, the applicant contested that assertion. He claimed to have raised that complaint several times throughout the investigation, in particular, in his application for release of 14 July 1998.
39. The case file contains no evidence that the applicant raised that issue in July - August 1998. Indeed, in his application for release of 14 July 1998 the applicant mentioned the situation concerning his glasses (see paragraph 13 above). However, in that application he primarily sought to prove that he was innocent, that his arrest and the criminal prosecution had been unlawful, and that he should be released. The applicant did not ask to have his glasses returned or to have his eyesight examined. In any event, it is unclear whether the court reviewing the lawfulness of the detention was competent to examine that issue and take appropriate measures.
40. In other circumstances the Court might have interpreted the applicant's wording as an implicit request warranting appropriate reaction from the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). However, in the circumstances there are no reasons to speculate on it, especially given that the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his choice who could have advised him to raise this issue before a competent authority (the investigator) in a more straightforward manner.
41. On the other hand, the Court cannot accept the Government's contention that the applicant did not raise the issue of the glasses until 2 December 1998. Having examined the materials in its possession the Court finds that the investigator had been aware of the applicant's problem well before that date. On 9 September 1998 the investigator ordered an examination of the applicant by an ophthalmologist - apparently in response to a request lodged by the defence some time earlier. It is unclear when such a request was lodged, but the Court is prepared to conclude that as from early September 1998 the prosecution knew about the difficult situation of the applicant. In any event, on 14 September 1998 the applicant's wife requested the district prosecutor to return the glasses to her husband (see paragraph 15 above).
42. It is true that the authorities did not remain passive; the applicant was sent to an ophthalmologist who made a prescription, and finally the applicant was given new glasses. However, it took the authorities almost five months to procure new glasses for him. Furthermore, the Government did not explain why his old glasses were not given back to him as soon as the investigator learned about the applicant's problem. Even though they were partially broken, they could have alleviated the difficulty he faced.
43. The Court has consistently stressed that certain forms of legitimate treatment or punishment - for example, a deprivation of liberty - may involve an inevitable element of suffering or humiliation. However, under Article 3 of the Convention the States must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance (see {Kudla} v. Poland [GC], No. 30210/96, §§ 92 - 94, ECHR 2000-XI). Taking the applicant's glasses could not be explained in terms of the "practical demands of imprisonment", and, even more so, was unlaw
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