any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
22. The Court reiterates its constant case-law to the effect that the quashing by way of supervisory review of a judicial decision which has become final and binding may render the litigant's right to a court illusory and infringe the principle of legal certainty (see, among many other authorities, {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 56 - 58, 24 July 2003). Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see, mutatis mutandis, Ryabykh, cited above, § 52).
23. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the judgment of 28 November 2001 in the part awarding the applicant damages was set aside by way of a supervisory review solely on the ground that the lower court had incorrectly assessed the circumstances of the case. The Court reiterates its constant approach that in the absence of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings a party's disagreement with the assessment made by the first instance court is not a circumstance of a substantial and compelling character warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see Dovguchits v. Russia, No. 2999/03, § 30, 7 June 2007; and Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007). The Government did not put forward any arguments which would enable the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present two cases.
24. The Court further notes that as a result of the proceedings following the quashing, the applicant's claim was partially granted on 17 December 2003 by the Magadan Town Court. The Court considers, however, that this fact did not by itself efface the effects of legal uncertainty the applicant had to endure after the judgment of 28 November 2001 had been quashed (see Zasurtsev v. Russia, No. 67051/01, § 51, 27 April 2006).
25. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the partial quashing of the judgment of 28 November 2001, as upheld on appeal on 22 January 2002.
III. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of delayed
enforcement of the judgment of 17 December 2003
26. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the prolonged failure to execute the judgment of 17 December 2003 in her favour. Article 6, in its relevant part, is cited above. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law..."
27. The Government submitted that the delay of execution did not exceed nine months and was reasonable. The applicant maintained her claim.
28. The Court observes that the judgment of 17 December 2003 was executed within 8 months and 22 days from the date of its entry into force. Such a delay does not appear excessive and is compatible with the Convention requirements (see Presnyakov v. Russia (dec.), No. 41145/02, 10 November 2005, Portnova v. Russia, No. 34428/04, § 15, 29 April 2008, and Fedorov and Others (dec.), No. 33382/04, 17 January 2008).
29. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. Alleged violation of Article 6
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account
of non-en
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