Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 01.04.2010 «Дело Павленко (Pavlenko) против России» [англ.]

sent application, including complaints about the conditions of detention in two detention facilities and the alleged lack of remedies in that respect.
69. The Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. Furthermore it ought to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for a prolonged period of time. The rule also affords the prospective applicant time to consider whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the specific complaints and arguments to be raised (see, for example, Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, §§ 32 and 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V). The rule should ensure that it is possible to ascertain the facts of the case before that possibility fades away, making a fair examination of the question at issue next to impossible (see Kelly v. the United Kingdom, No. 10626/83, Commission decision of 7 May 1985, Decisions and Reports (DR) 42, p. 205, and Baybora and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), No. 77116/01, 22 October 2002).
70. Normally, the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset however that no effective remedy was available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of. Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted however in a manner which would require an applicant to bring a complaint before Court before his position in connection with the matter has been finally determined at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 to calculate the six-month time-limit from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see, among others, Zenin v. Russia (dec.), No. 15413/03, 24 September 2009).
71. As with the exhaustion rule and the six-month requirement in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, there is also a close affinity between the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention and the exhaustion rule. The latter's purpose is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, among other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V). The rule in Article 35 § 1 is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13, that there is an effective domestic remedy available in respect of the alleged breach of an individual's Convention rights (see {Kudla} v. Poland [GC], No. 30210/96, § 152, ECHR 2000-XI). The only remedies which Article 35 of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches alleged and are both available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], No. 36813/97, § 142, ECHR 2006-...).
72. In view of the above, the Court will examine whether the applicant's complaints concerning both detention facilities comply with the admissibility criteria under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
(a) Temporary detention centre
73. The Court does not find that the applicant's detention in the temporary detention centre and the remand centre from 3 February 2001 to 27 June 2002 constituted a "continuing situation" requiring a global assessment (see Maltabar and Maltabar v. Russia, No. 6954/02, § 83, 29 January 2009). Thus, the Court observes that the applicant's detention in the temporary dete



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