esponsibility with regard to the enforcement of the said judgment. The Court therefore considers that it has jurisdiction to examine whether the domestic authorities have complied with their positive obligation to enforce the judgment given against a private entity in the applicant's favour. It accordingly dismisses the Government's preliminary objection (see Fuklev v. Ukraine, No. 71186/01, §§ 67 - 68, 7 June 2005).
30. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
31. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares, among other things, the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). A departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character, such as correction of fundamental defects or miscarriage of justice (see, among numerous authorities, Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003-IX).
32. While it may be accepted that Contracting States may, in exceptional circumstances and, by availing themselves of their margin of appreciation, intervene in proceedings for the enforcement of a judicial decision, the consequence of such an intervention should not be that execution is prevented, invalidated or unduly delayed or, still less, that the substance of the decision is undermined (see Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], No. 22774/93, § 74, ECHR 1999-V).
33. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that on 28 March 2001 the applicant obtained a judgment by which the Bank, a private legal entity, was to pay him interest and fees in respect of his deposit at the Bank. The judgment became final and enforceable on 22 August 2001. On 24 October 2001 the bailiff opened enforcement proceedings. However, on 24 December 2001 the court discontinued the enforcement of the judgment in the applicant's favour noting, with the reference to the entering into force on 15 August 2000 of the friendly settlement agreement between the Bank and its creditors, that the Bank was relieved of its obligation to pay the interest and other fees on the deposits of all creditors, including the applicant.
34. In this respect the Court notes that the validation of the friendly settlement agreement preceded by approximately a year the adoption of the judgment in the applicant's favour. Accordingly, had the Bank considered the agreement relevant in respect of the applicant's claims, it could have raised this issue before the domestic courts considering the dispute between the applicant and the Bank. The Bank did not do so. It remained silent as to the consequences the friendly settlement agreement could have had for the applicant's claims when the case was considered at the first level of jurisdiction. Nor did it raise that issue on appeal.
35. The Court further notes that the Government did not point to any exceptional circumstances that would have prevented the Bank from raising the issue of the friendly settlement agreement either at first or appeal instance. In such circumstances, the Bank's application for discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings was nothing but an attempt on the Bank's part to re-argue the case
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