privation of liberty.
192. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. Other alleged violations of the Convention
193. The applicant relied on Article 4 of the Convention, claiming that she had been subjected to forced labour during her imprisonment after the conviction. The Court observes that the applicant's situation is clearly justified under Article 4 § 3 (a) of the Convention, and therefore this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
194. The applicant further complained that her applications for release had been examined by the same two judges, A. or B., of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Town Court on most occasions, and that for this reason the review of her pre-trial detention had not been exercised by an independent and impartial judicial body. She was also dissatisfied with an alleged lack of legal assistance on several occasions during the investigation. The applicant further claimed that the trial court had not been impartial, since Judge K., who had presided in her case, had previously decided twice on her detention. The applicant referred to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention in connection with these complaints.
195. As far as the alleged lack of impartiality of the judges who examined the applicant's applications for release is concerned, the applicant presented no evidence of any actual bias on the part of the judges in question. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
196. As to the alleged breach of the applicant's right to defence during the investigation, the Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention does not guarantee the right to free legal aid at the pre-trial stage. Moreover, there is nothing in the applicant's submissions to disclose a violation of the relevant provision of Article 6 of the Convention, given that she had legal assistance from the very early stage of the criminal proceedings against her (see paragraph 9 above). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
197. As regards the complaint about the alleged bias of the trial judge, the Court reiterates that the mere fact that a trial judge has already taken pre-trial decisions in the case, including decisions relating to detention, cannot in itself justify fears as to his impartiality; only special circumstances may warrant a different conclusion (see Hauschildt v. Denmark, 24 May 1989, § 51, Series A No. 154 and Sainte-Marie v. France, No. 12981/87, § 32, 16 December 1992). It does not appear that there were any such circumstances in the present case: Judge K. only extended the applicant's pre-trial detention on 4 September and 4 November 2000 without even reviewing the lawfulness thereof, let alone assessing the degree of the applicant's guilt (see, by contrast, Hauschildt, cited above, § 52). This complaint therefore is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
198. The applicant also submitted that the overall length of the criminal proceedings against her had exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is "charged" within the autonomous and substantive meaning of that term and ends with the day on which a charge is finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued (see, among many other authorities, Kalashnikov, cited above, § 124). In the present case, the applicant was detained and questioned as an accused on 28 February 2000 and her conviction was u
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