ollowed in order to ensure that legal basis for such activities and the corresponding practice are in full compliance with the relevant judgments..."
THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention
19. The applicant complained that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the procedural inequality in the appeal proceedings. He referred to the public prosecutor's participation in the appeal proceedings, as well as the absence of an opportunity to make comments to the prosecutor's final remarks at the closure of the appeal hearing. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing... by [a]... tribunal..."
A. Admissibility
20. With reference to the Court's judgment in the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], No. 63235/00, in fine, ECHR 2007-IV), the Government considered that the applicant's complaint was incompatible ratione materiae.
21. The applicant made no comment.
22. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 in its "civil" limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute over a "civil right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is also protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among others, Itslayev v. Russia, No. 34631/02, § 25, 9 October 2008). The character of the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, commercial, administrative law, and so on) and that of the authority which is invested with jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court, administrative body, and so forth) are therefore of little consequence (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], No. 17056/06, § 74, ECHR 2009-...).
23. The applicant's claims were not excluded as such from judicial protection. He thus made use of this opportunity and introduced an action against the State bodies. It is also noted that in addition to contesting a contract between the Ministry of Defence and an air company, the applicant lodged claims for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in relation to the refusal of a free ticket in February 1998. Apparently, he based his claims on the national legislation concerning leave arrangements for the military personnel. The Court considers on the basis of the available information that the claims for compensation could be qualified as "civil" in the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court also considers that the dispute was "serious and genuine" (see, by contrast, Serov v. Russia, No. 75894/01, § 56, 26 June 2008). Indeed, the Government raised no objections on that account.
24. It is further noted that the military court refused to examine the case on account of the applicant's failure to comply with the statutory time-limit for lodging it (see paragraphs 10 - 13 above). Neither the domestic courts nor the Government indicated that the domestic system barred the applicant's access to a court for reasons other than the ordinary requirement of a time-limit. The time-limit issue, in particular as regards the existence and validity of any eventual excuse for a belated claim, was aired and discussed at a court hearing. The appeal proceedings, which are at the heart of the Convention complaint in the present application, concerned the same matter.
25. In view of the above, and irrespective of the fact that the domest
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