ts disposal, can it conclude that this is a case where "extremely poor conditions of detention, as well as ill-treatment and torture, remain a great concern for all observers of the situation" (see Ryabikin v. Russia, No. 8320/04, § 116, 19 June 2008). Lastly, the Colombian authorities have not refused to allow monitoring of places of detention of persons convicted of terrorism-related activities. Therefore, the Court could have considered that the mere risk of the applicant's being detained in poor conditions, in the event of his extradition to Colombia, would not in itself reach the minimum level of severity.
Turning to the applicant's personal situation, the Court observes in its judgment that the reason why he fears that he would be singled out as a target of ill-treatment when in Colombia is that Vice-President Santos reportedly stated that the applicant should "rot in jail". But the applicant has not indicated the source of the information concerning the statement in question! The Russian newspaper article, a copy of which was submitted by the applicant, merely cited the Colombian Vice-President without any reference to the circumstances under which the statement in question had been made. Furthermore, the applicant has not provided the Court with any evidence from the International Relations and Security Network website, which allegedly reproduced the statement in question. In such circumstances the Court is usually unable to assess fully the nature of the statement and the connotations it might have had in the original language. In any event, we are not prepared to conclude that a statement expressing the wish of an executive official to have a convicted prisoner "rot in jail" could in itself amount to a serious threat of ill-treatment, given its vague and hyperbolic wording. Thus, we consider that the applicant has failed to demonstrate any individualised risk of ill-treatment to which he would be subjected in Colombia if extradited.
Further, the Colombian authorities provided their Russian counterparts with diplomatic assurances stating, in particular, that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment (see paragraph 16 of the judgment). In examining the lawfulness of the extradition decision, the Russian courts relied on those assurances (see paragraphs 19 and 21). However, the Court observes that the assurances in question "were rather vague and lacked precision; hence, it is bound to question their value" (see paragraph 55).
The Court examines whether diplomatic assurances in expulsion and extradition cases provide, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V). The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], No. 37291/06, § 148, ECHR 2008-...). We note that Colombia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and voluntarily cooperates with international human rights institutions (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). A field office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) operates in the country. The Government of Colombia allows access by international observers to the country, in particular, to places of detention (see paragraph 35 of the judgment). Accordingly, fulfilment of the diplomatic assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or other ill-treatment could be subject to independent and objective monitoring.
The Court does not have valid reasons to foresee with any degree of certainty that Colombia would fail to comply with its obligations arising from international law (see, mutatis mutandis, Einhorn v. France (dec.), No. 71555/01, § 33, ECHR 2001-XI).<
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