emedy before it is effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see {Conka} v. Belgium, No. 51564/99, § 75, ECHR 2002-I).
66. At the same time the Court does not lose sight of the applicant's argument pertaining to the unenforceability of the judicial award. In this connection it is worth noting that the requirements of Article 13 take the form of a guarantee and not of a mere statement of intent or a practical arrangement. That is one of the consequences of the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, which is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see {Conka}, cited above, § 83). The Court reiterates that the enforceability of awards is among the requirements of Article 13 (see T.P. and K.M., cited above, § 109). While acknowledgment of the wrong done might bring some degree of redress and satisfaction, if the redress measures are never implemented it cannot be said that the applicant concerned has obtained redress beyond a "paper" judgment.
67. It appears that the Russian courts are not required to give even minimal consideration to the issue of the possible enforcement of the judicial award they make against a private tortfeasor. Ultimately, a successful plaintiff has no possibility of foreseeing whether he will, in fact, receive the judicial award made in his favour. However, the Court is mindful of the fact that in the sphere of enforcement of judgments of a civil character the State's positive obligation under the Convention is limited to organising a system for enforcement of judgments which is effective both in law and in practice, and ensuring their enforcement without undue delay (see Sanglier v. France, No. 50342/99, § 39, 27 May 2003, and Fuklev v. Ukraine, No. 71186/01, § 84, 7 June 2005). Only when the authorities are obliged to act in order to enforce a judgment and they fail to do so can their inactivity engage the State's responsibility under the Convention (see Scollo v. Italy, 28 September 1995, § 44, Series A No. 315-C).
68. The Court observes that the applicant did not argue that the Russian internal legal order was not capable of guaranteeing the execution of the judgment given in his case or that the State - as the holder of public authority - did not act diligently in order to assist the applicant in securing execution of the judgment award against Mr N. The Court notes that the judgment of 6 June 2002 awarding the applicant damages to be paid by Mr N., as upheld on appeal on 27 August 2002, was final and binding, thus complying with the requirement of enforceability laid down by Article 13 of the Convention.
69. Furthermore, continuing with the applicant's argument as to the unenforceability of the award, the Court is mindful of the choice of remedies which were open to the applicant. Quite apart from the criminal proceedings to which he was a civil party, the applicant had the right to seek damages from the State, by either lodging a tort action in parallel with the criminal investigation against Mr N., although not within the criminal proceedings themselves, or by bringing such an action after the criminal proceedings were completed (see paragraph 52 above). There was nothing to stop the applicant bringing such an action at the appropriate moment and arguing that the State should be held liable for Mr N.'s actions and should pay compensation for the injury sustained. The Court is of the opinion that, had the applicant chosen that avenue instead of introducing an action against Mr N. within the criminal case, he could have excluded the risk of obtaining an award against an insolvent defendant. However, the applicant made the legal choice of introducing the action against Mr N. and should therefore bear the legal consequences, including the defendant's insolvency
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