vernment, the latter application was lodged on 20 January 2003 and it was examined on the same day. The Court notes that the case file contains copies of two applications by counsel Kh.: one of 20 November 2002 and another one of 20 January 2003. It observes, next, that the Tambov Regional Court referred in its decision of 20 January 2003 to "an application by lay representative R. and counsel Kh." without specifying when the application had been lodged. The Court, further, observes that the copy of the application signed by R. did not indicate a date, but contained an endorsement that it had been "received on 9 December 2002". The Court accepts that the signature of the recipient was that of a court official because the Government did not challenge the validity or the origin of the endorsement. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it to be established that three applications for release were lodged on the applicant's behalf: on 20 November 2002 by counsel Kh., on 9 December 2002 by lay representative R. and on 20 January 2003 by counsel Kh.
98. As indicated above (see paragraph 97), it is not clear from the Tambov Regional Court's decision whether it examined all of these applications on 20 January 2003, or only two of them. The latter case would mean that one of the applications by counsel Kh. was left unexamined. However, the Court does not need to resolve the doubt because even assuming that all three applications were examined, this was done two months after the lodging of the application of 20 November 2002 and one month and eleven days after the lodging of that of 9 December 2002. There is nothing to suggest that the applicant had caused any delays in the examination of the applications. The Court considers that the impugned periods cannot be considered compatible with the "speediness" requirement of Article 5 § 4, especially taking into account that their entire duration was attributable to the authorities (see, for example, Mamedova v. Russia, No. 7064/05, § 96, 1 June 2006; Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 198 and 203; and Rehbock v. Slovenia, No. 29462/95, §§ 85 and 86, ECHR 2000-XII, where review proceedings which lasted twenty-three days were found not to have been "speedy").
99. The Court also observes that the fact that the applicant was found guilty of a criminal offence and that the duration of her pre-trial detention counted towards her sentence cannot in principle justify the failure to examine speedily her applications for release (see Bednov v. Russia, No. 21153/02, § 33, 1 June 2006).
100. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
IV. Other alleged violations of the Convention
101. The Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court's competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
V. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
102. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
103. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning the unlawfulness of the appli
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