led to appear at several hearings without providing any justification for their absences. Therefore, the resulting delays are attributable to the applicants.
43. Regarding the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Court notes the Government's argument that during the period under consideration the domestic authorities examined the case in two rounds of proceedings. The Court observes in this respect that the need for the second round of the proceedings was attributable to the District Court's failure to properly establish important circumstances of the case. In any event the fact that the domestic courts heard the case several times did not absolve them from complying with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 (see Litoselitis v. Greece, No. 62771/00, § 32, 5 February 2004).
44. Furthermore, the Court does not agree with the Government that the domestic courts conducted the proceedings properly. The Court observes that on 12 March 1999 the District Court allowed the applicants' objection to Judge K. and reassigned the case to Judge B. The latter contested that decision before the Regional Court. It was not until November 1999 that the Regional Court dismissed his request and referred the case to the District Court for examination on the merits. As a result the proceedings were delayed by seven months. The proceedings were delayed by another four months when on 3 April 2000 they were adjourned until 4 August 2000. According to the Government, it had not been possible to schedule the hearing for an earlier date because the judge was busy in unrelated proceedings. Furthermore, another delay of four months occurred during the transfer of the case from the District Court to the Regional Court for examination on appeal in the first round of proceedings. The Court reiterates that it is for Contracting States to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can guarantee the right of everyone to obtain a final decision within a reasonable time (see, for instance, {Loffler} v. Austria, No. 30546/96, § 21, 3 October 2000). The manner in which a State provides for mechanisms to comply with this requirement - whether by increasing the numbers of judges, or by automatic time-limits and directions, or by some other method - is for the State to decide. If a State lets proceedings continue beyond the "reasonable time" prescribed by Article 6 of the Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be responsible for the resultant delay (see Price and Lowe v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 43185/98 and 43186/98, § 23, 29 July 2003). The Court finds that in the present case the authorities did not take due measures to speed up the proceedings. The Court therefore considers that the domestic courts were responsible for the most significant delays in the proceedings.
45. In the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the "reasonable time" requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
46. The applicants complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they had not had an effective remedy against the length of the proceedings. Article 13 of the Convention provides as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
A. Admissibility
47. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. I
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