int is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
25. The Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, No. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). To decide if the delay was reasonable, the Court will look at how complex the enforcement proceedings were, how the applicant and the authorities behaved, and what the nature of the award was (see Raylyan v. Russia, No. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
26. In the present case, the judgment of 28 November 2003 as upheld on 14 January 2004 was fully enforced in August 2005, approximately 19 months after it had become final.
27. The judgment of 6 December 2004 was enforced in full on 20 April 2007, which is some 28 months after the judgment had become final.
28. The judgments were not difficult to enforce as they required only a bank transfer. The applicant did not obstruct the enforcement.
29. The Court concludes that the enforcement of the judgments of 28 November 2003, as upheld on 14 January 2004, and of 6 December 2004 took too long and that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
on account of excessive length of proceedings
30. The applicant complained that the length of both sets of proceedings, which ended with the judgments of 28 November 2003, as upheld on 14 January 2004, and of 6 December 2004 respectively, had been incompatible with the "reasonable time" requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations..., everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]... tribunal..."
31. The Court reiterates that the periods of pure non-enforcement should not be taken into account in respect of the complaint concerning the length of proceedings if the Court has already considered these periods when assessing the complaint about the non-enforcement (see Malama v. Greece, No. 43622/98, § 34 ECHR 2001-II; Androsov v. Russia, No. 63973/00, § 76, 6 October 2005; and Veretennikov v. Russia, No. 8363/03, § 31, 12 March 2009).
32. Therefore the period to be taken into consideration in respect of the first set of proceedings began on 3 December 2000 and ended on 14 January 2004 (see paragraphs 7 - 14 above). It thus lasted 3 years and 10 months, for two levels of jurisdiction.
33. In respect of the second set of proceedings the period lasted from 3 March 2004 until 6 December 2004 (see paragraphs 17 - 19 above), which is approximately nine months, for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
34. As to the first set of proceedings, the Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
35. As to the second set of proceedings, the length of proceedings of some nine months does not raise an issue under the Convention and the relevant complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 as inadmissible (see, for example, Ivanova v. Russia (dec.), No. 74705/01, 1 April 2004).
B. Merits
36. The Government did not comment on the issue.
37. The applicant maintained his complaint.
38. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference
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