oy evidence, the domestic authorities did not cite any concrete facts warranting the applicant's detention on that ground. They did not indicate any circumstance to suggest that, if released, the applicant would abscond, re-offend or otherwise upset the course of the trial. The domestic courts merely repeated the same conclusion concerning possible collusion, without citing any reason why, notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of his requests for release, they considered the risk of interference with witnesses and evidence to exist and be decisive. Furthermore, the Court has not lost sight of the fact that the applicant was not in custody for a certain period after the criminal proceedings had been instituted on the fraud charge. The domestic courts did not make any reference to inappropriate or unlawful behaviour by the applicant during that period. Nor did the Government dispute the applicant's assertion that he had complied with the prosecution's orders and had participated in the investigation process, whenever summoned. The Court is therefore not convinced that the domestic authorities' findings that the applicant was likely to pervert the course of justice or abscond had a sufficient basis in fact.
107. The Court further emphasises that when deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities have an obligation under Article 5 § 3 to consider alternative measures to ensure his or her appearance at the trial (see Sulaoja v. Estonia, No. 55939/00, § 64, 15 February 2005, and {Jablonski} v. Poland, No. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000). During the entire period under consideration the authorities did not consider the possibility of ensuring the applicant's attendance by the use of other "preventive measures" - such as a written undertaking or bail - which are expressly provided for by Russian law to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, or, at the very minimum, seek to explain in their decisions why such alternatives would not have ensured that the trial would follow its proper course.
108. In sum, the Court finds that the domestic authorities' decisions were not based on an analysis of all the pertinent facts. They paid no regard to the arguments in favour of the applicant's release pending trial, such as his family situation and his behaviour prior to the arrest. It is also of particular concern to the Court that the Russian authorities persistently used a stereotyped summary formula to justify extending his detention.
109. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to address concrete relevant facts or consider alternative "preventive measures" and by relying essentially on the gravity of the charges, the authorities prolonged the applicant's detention on grounds which cannot be regarded as "sufficient". They thus failed to justify the applicant's continued detention for more than a year and a half. It is hence not necessary to examine whether the proceedings against the applicant were conducted with due diligence during that period as such a lengthy period cannot in the circumstances be regarded as "reasonable" within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Mishketkul and Others v. Russia, No. 36911/02, § 59, 24 May 2007, with further references).
110. The Court accordingly finds a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention
111. The applicant, relying on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, complained that his appeal against the decision of 8 October 2003 and his request for release lodged on 24 November 2003 had not been examined. In his additional application form lodged on 26 July 2004 he further complained that the domestic courts had not promptly examined his requests for release and his appeals against the detention decisions issued be
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