in which violations of "fair trial" guarantees were found, in that the applicant decided of his own accord not to appear and not to be represented by counsel (see Goddi v. Italy, 9 April 1984, § 26, Series A No. 76; Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, § 28, Series A No. 89; F.C.B. v. Italy, 28 August 1991, §§ 30 - 33, Series A No. 208-B; T. v. Italy, 12 October 1992, § 27, Series A No. 245-C; Lala, cited above; and Pelladoah, cited above).
135. In this connection the Court notes that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see Kwiatkowska v. Italy (dec.), No. 52868/99, 30 November 2000). However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], No. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-II; Kolu v. Turkey, No. 35811/97, § 53, 2 August 2005; and Colozza, cited above, § 28). A waiver of the right, once invoked, must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and informed relinquishment of the right. Before an accused can be said to have implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (see Talat {Tunc} v. Turkey, No. 32432/96, 27 March 2007, § 59, and Jones v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 30900/02, 9 September 2003).
136. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court is convinced that the applicant, in a knowing, explicit and unequivocal manner, waived his right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance at the trial. At no point in the domestic proceedings or proceedings before the Court did the applicant dispute the voluntary and informed character of that waiver. The circumstances surrounding Ms Karlova's repeated refusal to represent the applicant, despite the trial court's attempts to discipline her, further support the conclusion of the deliberate character of the applicant's absence and dismissal of his counsel. The Court also considers that the applicant, being initially represented by three lawyers of his own choosing, could have been advised by his lawyers of the consequences of his refusal to attend the trial hearings and to terminate representation contracts and could have been expected to appreciate that his failure to attend and to retain counsel would result in his being tried and convicted in his absence and in the absence of legal representation (see, by contrast, Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 25 February 1992, § 38, Series A No. 227, and Jones, cited above).
137. The Court does not lose sight, nevertheless, of the applicant's argument that, despite the waiver, the decision of the Justice of the Peace to continue the trial in the absence of the applicant and/or his legal representatives ran contrary to the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. In this regard the Court reiterates that proceedings held in an accused's absence are not in principle incompatible with the Convention if the person concerned can subsequently obtain from a court which has heard him a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact (see Poitrimol, cited above, § 31). It is open to question whether this latter requirement applies when the accused has waived his right to appear and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance (ibid). However, the Court does not have to determine this issue in the present case as it considers that it was, for reasons laid down below, in any event, open to the applicant to seek a fresh determination of his conviction.
138. The Court notes that the applicant appealed against his conviction to the Leninskiy District
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