o his claim that he had been ill-treated by the police. Despite the fact that the applicant in that case was represented by his wife, the Court considered it relevant that his claim had been largely based on his personal experience and that his submissions would therefore have been "an important part of the plaintiff's presentation of the case and virtually the only way to ensure adversarial proceedings" (see Kovalev v. Russia, No. 78145/01, § 37, 10 May 2007).
60. The Court further observes that Article 6 of the Convention does not guarantee the right to personal presence before a civil court but rather a more general right to present one's case effectively before the court and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side. Article 6 § 1 leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used in guaranteeing litigants these rights (see Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, No. 68416/01, §§ 59 - 60, ECHR 2005-II).
61. The Court notes that the Russian Code of Civil Procedure provides for the plaintiff's right to appear in person before a civil court hearing his claim (see paragraph 21 above). However, neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor the Code of Corrections make special provision for the exercise of that right by individuals who are in custody, whether they are in pre-trial detention or are serving a sentence. In the present case the applicant's requests for leave to appear were denied precisely on the ground that the domestic law did not make provision for convicted persons to be brought from correctional institutions to the place where their civil claim was being heard.
62. The issue of the exercise of procedural rights by detainees in civil proceedings has been examined on several occasions by the Russian Constitutional Court, which has identified several ways in which their rights can be secured (see paragraph 23 above). It has consistently emphasised representation as an appropriate solution in cases where a party cannot appear in person before a civil court. Given the obvious difficulties involved in transporting convicted persons from one location to another, the Court can in principle accept that in cases where the claim is not based on the plaintiff's personal experiences, representation of the detainee by an advocate would not be in breach of the principle of equality of arms.
63. Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court accepts the Government's argument that the domestic courts had acted in strict compliance with applicable rules of civil procedure when considering the applicant's action for damages. They duly advised him of his rights, including the right to be represented (see, by contrast, Khuzhin, cited above, §§ 106 - 09). Nevertheless, in the circumstances the Court is not convinced that the representative's appearance before the court could have secured the effective, proper and satisfactory presentation of the applicant's case.
64. The Court observes that the applicant's claims were, to a major extent, based on his personal experience. The Court considers that his testimony describing the conditions of his detention, of which only the applicant himself had first-hand knowledge, would have constituted an indispensable part of the plaintiff's presentation of the case (see Kovalev, cited above, § 37). Only the applicant could, by testifying in person, substantiate his claims and answer the judges' questions, if any.
65. The Court also notes that the domestic courts refused the applicant leave to appear, relying on the absence of a legal norm requiring his presence. In this connection, the Court is also mindful of another possibility which was open to the domestic courts as a way of securing the applicant's participation in the proceedings. The District Court could have held a session in the correctional institution where the applicant was serving his senten
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