by the third and first applicants' shouting and screaming.
103. Having therefore found that the servicemen on the roof were aware of the presence of the vehicle and the fact that Mayrudin Khantiyev was being abducted and even assuming that the related events were advancing very quickly, the Court is particularly struck by the absolute lack of any reaction on the part of the servicemen. Thus, although they had the necessary communication equipment (see paragraph 64 above), it transpires that they made no attempts whatsoever to alert the adjacent checkpoints to be on the lookout for the Niva vehicle (compare {Osmanoglu} v. Turkey, No. 48804/99, § 80, 24 January 2008). Neither did they come downstairs to verify what had occurred. The Court considers that this blatant passivity of State agents in the face of an abduction of a person in their full view is yet another element which weighs heavily against the Government's submission that State agents were not implicated in Mayrudin Khantiyev's disappearance.
104. The Court also took note of the Government's submission that, according to the FSB Department of the Chechen Republic, Mayrudin Khantiyev was a member of an organised group trading in arms and ammunition, including their acquisition in exchange for drugs (see paragraph 66 above). In view of the fact that the security forces had the above-mentioned information on the applicants' relative and having regard to the nature of that information and the overall situation in the Chechen Republic at the material time, the Court is led to surmise that Mayrudin Khantiyev was, at the very least, closely surveyed by State bodies.
105. Having regard to all elements enunciated in paragraphs 92 - 104 above, the Court attaches particular weight to the authorities' exclusive control over the area, the lack of any action on the part of the servicemen from the roof unit in the face of the abduction, the Government's failure to furnish a convincing explanation as to how a group of armed men could have arrived at the place of the abduction in a vehicle without registration plates and could have abducted the applicants' relative without any reaction on the part of the servicemen from the roof unit, and also to the Government's unjustified refusal to submit any documents from the investigation case file. On the basis of all those elements taken together the Court finds it established, to the requisite standard of proof, that on 4 December 2000 Mayrudin Khantiyev was abducted by State agents during an unacknowledged security operation.
106. The Court has to decide further whether Mayrudin Khantiyev is to be presumed dead. It notes in this regard that there has been no reliable news of him since 4 December 2000. His name has not been found in any official records of detention facilities. Lastly, the Government did not submit any explanation as to what had happened to him after his abduction.
107. Having regard to the previous cases concerning disappearances in Chechnya which have come before it (see, among others, Bazorkina, cited above; Imakayeva, cited above; Luluyev and Others v. Russia, No. 69480/01, ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Baysayeva v. Russia, No. 74237/01, 5 April 2007; Akhmadova and Sadulayeva, cited above; and Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia, No. 68007/01, 5 July 2007), the Court considers that, in the context of the conflict in the Chechen Republic, when a person is detained by unidentified servicemen without any subsequent acknowledgment of the detention, this can be regarded as life-threatening. The absence of Mayrudin Khantiyev or of any news of him for over seven years corroborates this assumption.
108. Accordingly, the Court finds it established that on 4 December 2000 Mayrudin Khantiyev was abducted by State servicemen and that he must be presumed dead following his unacknowledged detention.
(iii) The State's compliance wit
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