999, when he was released on the expiry of the maximum permissible period of his detention pending investigation; (3) from 14 December 1999, when he was again detained pending trial, until 24 January 2000, when the court sentenced him to a period of probation; and (4) from 13 September 2001, when the applicant was again arrested pending the second trial, until his conviction on 1 July 2003.
78. The Court observes that the initial three-day period of the applicant's detention falls outside the scope of its competence ratione temporis, as the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia on 5 May 1998.
79. The Court further observes that the second and third periods of the applicant's detention ended respectively on 24 July 1999 and 24 January 2000, whereas the applicant did not lodge his application until 29 November 2002, that is to say, more than six months later.
80. In circumstances where applicants have continued to be deprived of their liberty while the criminal proceedings were pending at the appeal stage, the Court has always regarded the multiple consecutive pre-trial detention periods as a whole and found that the six-month rule should start to run only from the end of the last period of pre-trial detention (see, among numerous authorities, Solmaz v. Turkey, No. 27561/02, §§ 34 - 37, ECHR 2007... (extracts)).
81. It appears that the Court has also adhered to this approach in some cases where an applicant's detention pending trial before a first-instance court was not continuous, without, however, setting out explicitly the reasons why it considered such periods cumulatively (see Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, § 34, Series A No. 207; Smirnova v. Russia, Nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 66, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts), and Mitev v. Bulgaria, No. 40063/98, § 102, 22 December 2004).
82. On the other hand, the Court observes that in an earlier case it employed a different approach (see Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 6, Series A No. 8). In Neumeister the Court did not add up, or consider as a whole, two separate periods of the applicant's pre-trial detention for the purposes of calculating its length. The Court noted that it could not examine whether or not the first period of the applicant's pre-trial detention was compatible with the Convention given that he had not lodged his application until after the six-month time-limit in respect of that period had expired. The Court merely noted that it would take that period into account in assessing the reasonableness of the applicant's later detention as the first period would normally be deducted from the ensuing term of imprisonment should the applicant be found guilty and given a prison sentence (ibid.).
83. In the instant case, as in the case of Neumeister, the applicant's detention was broken up into several non-consecutive periods. He was released twice during the trial and awaited the determination of the criminal charges against him while at liberty. Significant periods of time elapsed between the periods of his detention. Even though the detention periods were eventually deducted from the term of the applicant's imprisonment, this fact alone does not allow the Court to regard his detention as consecutive. To find otherwise would strip the six-month rule of its meaning.
84. Accordingly, the Court finds that the part of the applicant's complaint concerning the second and third periods of his pre-trial detention, which ended on 24 July 1999 and 24 January 2000 respectively, cannot in the circumstances be examined.
85. Thus, the Court concludes that the period under consideration in the present case started on 13 September 2001, when the applicant was arrested and placed in custody pending the second trial, and ended on 1 July 2003, when he was convicted by a court of first instance. It thus lasted almost one year and ten months.
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