nt thus argued that the interference with the applicant's right to withdraw his savings had been of a temporary nature and in the public interest, given the difficult situation in the Chechen Republic in the middle of the 1990s and the possibility of falsification of claims concerning the reimbursement of deposits made with the Chechen Savings Bank.
42. As regards the applicant's argument that his deposits had significantly depreciated in value, the Government relied on the Court's established case-law, stating that the Convention did not guarantee the right to acquire possessions, or the right to have the purchasing power of the national currency maintained by the State.
B. The Court's assessment
43. The Court observes that some of the events referred to by the applicant took place before 5 May 1998, the date of the ratification of the Convention by Russia, and considers it appropriate to distinguish two periods for the purpose of examining the present case.
1. Events before 5 May 1998
44. The Court observes at the outset that in 1996 the management bodies of the Savings Bank of Russia decided to ban for an indefinite period any operations in respect of deposits made with the Chechen Savings Bank, and then to wind it up. Those decisions, which both pre-dated the ratification of the Convention by Russia, served as the basis for the Savings Bank's repeated refusal to return the applicant's deposits and constituted therefore an interference with the applicant's property rights. The Court further considers that such interference amounted to a de facto deprivation of the applicant's possessions since the right of the depositors of the Chechen Savings Bank, including the applicant, to dispose of their funds was de facto extinguished by virtue of the aforementioned two decisions (see Cherkashin v. Russia (partial decision), No. 7412/02, 30 March 2006, and Pupkov v. Russia (dec.), No. 42453/02, 17 January 2008).
45. The Court reiterates in this connection that the deprivation of property is an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of "deprivation" of these rights (see {Blecic}, cited above, § 86). It therefore finds that it has no jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the applicant's complaint in so far as it relates to the events that took place prior to 5 May 1998 (see Cherkashin and Pupkov, both cited above).
2. Events after 5 May 1998
46. Having regard to its above finding that the applicant had been deprived of his property prior to the ratification of the Convention by Russia and that this had been an instantaneous act not creating any continuing situation, the Court has to ascertain whether, in the period subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was applicable in the circumstances of the present case and, if so, whether it was complied with.
(a) Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
47. The Court reiterates that, according to its established case-law, "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 can be either "existing possessions" or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see {Kopecky} v. Slovakia [GC], No. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004-IX, and the authorities cited therein).
48. In the present case, the Court has established above that the applicant's rights to his deposits were extinguished by relevant decisions taken in 1996. It is therefore clear that on the da
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