inding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, No. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). To decide if the delay was reasonable, the Court will look at how complex the enforcement proceedings were, how the applicant and the authorities behaved, and what was the nature of the award (see Raylyan v. Russia, No. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
72. As to the period to be taken into consideration, the Government suggested that the period of enforcement should run from the moment when the applicant submitted a writ of execution to a competent authority.
73. The Court notes in this respect that where a judgment is against the State, the State must take the initiative to enforce it (see Akashev v. Russia, No. 30616/05, §§ 21 - 23, 12 June 2008). Accordingly, in respect of the judgment of 18 November 1997, the period started on 5 May 1998, the date when the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia.
74. Consequently, the period of non-enforcement of that judgment lasted no less than two years, 10 months and 11 days, before it was quashed by way of supervisory review on 15 March 2001.
75. Taking into account that the judgment was not difficult to enforce as it required only bank transfers and the applicant did not obstruct the enforcement, this period is sufficient to find a violation of the Convention.
76. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account
of supervisory review
77. In the letter of 8 January 2004 the applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the judgment of 10 December 2002, as upheld on 7 May 2003, had been quashed on a supervisory review on 13 November 2003. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (cited above).
78. The Government contested that argument.
79. They argued, inter alia, that the supervisory review had been compatible with the Convention because it had been lawful under domestic law and had been intended to correct mistakes in implementation of law. The reasons cited by the supervisory-review court had justified the quashing. In fact, the new judgment of 24 March 2005, made after the review, was more favourable to the applicant that the quashed one.
A. Admissibility
80. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
81. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental errors (see Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 51 - 52, ECHR 2003-IX). To answer this complaint the Court will hence have to determine if the grounds for the quashing of the applicant's judgment fell within this exception (see Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, § 29, 31 July 2008).
82. In the case at hand, none of the grounds cited by the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court were fundamental (see para. 17 above). All of these grounds concerned different interpretation of the substantive, not procedural, law, which cannot be considered as an exceptional circumstance warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and a reopening of the proceedings on the applicant's claims (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
83. The Government's argument that the judgment of 24 March 2005 was more favourable to the applicant than the judgment of 10 December 2002 is not convincing. In
> 1 2 3 ... 5 6 7 ... 9 10 11
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
