applicant's arguments and extended his detention, finding that he might abscond or intimidate witnesses (see paragraph 33 above).
122. As the Court has observed, Article 35 must be applied to reflect the practical realities of the applicant's position. Although an appeal against a detention order is in principle an effective remedy in such cases, the Court considers that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected to appeal to the St Petersburg City Court, which had already repeatedly examined the issue as a first-instance court and rejected his arguments. Nothing in the case file indicates that the applicant's circumstances materially changed after the City Court had made the extension orders or that any new factors emerged subsequently that could have altered the position of the City Court. The Court finds that, having regard to the practical realities of the applicant's position, it could not be said that an appeal to the City Court had any reasonable prospects of success. The Court therefore considers that there existed special circumstances dispensing the applicant from the obligation to appeal to the St Petersburg City Court against the detention orders issued during the judicial proceedings.
123. The Court concludes, in light of the above, that the application cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. It further notes that the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
124. The Government argued that the decisions to remand the applicant in custody had been lawful and well-reasoned. The applicant had been charged with several financial offences, each of which was serious enough to justify his detention. He had been suspected of being a member of an organised criminal group. Referring to the case of Contrada v. Italy (24 August 1998, § 67, Reports 1998-V), the Government submitted that his membership of a mafia-type organisation with a rigid hierarchical structure and substantial power of intimidation had complicated and lengthened the criminal proceedings. The applicant had moreover breached his undertaking not to reoffend and had continued his unlawful business activities. Therefore, there had been reasons to believe that he would reoffend if released. He had also attempted to interfere with the proceedings by intimidating witnesses, several of whom had even requested anonymity and police protection. The Government considered that the applicant's detention had been founded on "relevant and sufficient" reasons.
125. The applicant maintained his claims. He argued that there had been no evidence that he had interfered with witnesses. Moreover, the analogy between his case and the mafia cases was misplaced as he had been charged with financial offences.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
126. The Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of his or her continued detention. However, after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are found to have been "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, §§ 152 and 153, ECHR 2000-IV).
127. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting
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